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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS FOR THE POOR
It seems a virtual fairy tale that somewhere, at the ends of the earth, an
accused person can avail himself of a lawyer's help. This means having beside
you in the most difficult moment of your life a clear-minded ally who knows
the law.
-A. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago
I. Introduction
In 1962, the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright' held that indigents
charged with felonies were entitled to counsel as a matter of constitutional right.
That decision was a long time in coming and the pressure behind it generated
an avalanche of decisions in the ensuing decade, extending the right to counsel
to interrogations,2 lineups,' preliminary hearings,4 and finally in Argersinger v.
Hamlin5 to misdemeanor prosecutions involving a likelihood of imprisonment.
These and other Supreme Court and lower court decisions provide a fairly com-
plete constitutional assurance of the effective assistance of counsel in most
criminal and many "non-criminal" settings.
Difficult conceptual questions remain to be litigated, including problems
of waiver, competency of counsel, and right to counsel at proceedings such as
parole hearings. Even Argersinger, the most recent right to counsel decision,
raises difficult questions of interpretation.' Eventually, the courts must attempt
to grapple with the thorny problem of the consequences of denial of counsel.8
These important problems deserve and no doubt will receive scholarly attention.
This article will pursue a vital theme largely ignored in the commentary
following Gideon. The states opposed Clarence Gideon in part on the ground
that there were no resources to implement a right to counsel. Echoes of that
argument could be heard ten years later in Argersinger and appear in Justice
Brennan's reference9 to the availability of law school clinics to provide badly
needed resources. In the decade since Gideon, the Supreme Court has barely
acknowledged the vast problems posed by an ever-expanding constitutional
guarantee of counsel. However, if troops are not available, the army cannot
march. Even more tragic, if the few troops available are ill-supported and
1 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); see also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972).
4 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
5 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
6 See, e.g., as to juvenile courts, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); as to mental commit-
ments, Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1098 (E. D. Wis. 1972); Heryford v. Parker,
396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
7 For example, concerning how likely punishment must be before counsel may be
required. See Wood v. Superintendent, 355 F. Supp. 338, 343-44 (E.D. Va. 1973).
8 Convictions without counsel may not be used. for recidivist statute purposes, Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) ; or for sentencing, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) ;
or for impeaching credibility, Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972). Although these principles
are now established, innumerable questions remain unresolved, complicated by the unclear
implications of the harmless error rule. See text accompanying note 13 infra.
9 407 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ill-trained, the battle will surely be lost. A decade after Gideon the question re-
mains whether we can indeed render effective assistance of counsel.
All too often the issue arises after the fact in a postconviction inquiry into
services rendered in a specific case. This approach cannot deal with system-wide
resource problems. Indeed, even as to a single case, postconviction relief is
woefully limited in scope and efficacy. The inertia, politics, and orderliness of
the processes of justice lead to nearly impossible burdens of proof for defendants.
A conviction stands unless the defendant shows that the "purported represen-
tation by counsel was such as to make the trial a farce and a mockery of justice."'0
The value of hindsight inquiry is further limited by counsel's power to waive
rights of the accused, either by strategy" or permissible bungling.'2 Another
limitation is the pervasive doctrine of harmless error, through which prejudice
which cannot be shown is often found not to exist.' 3
Any defendant who claims ineffective assistance of counsel thus finds the
courts ill-disposed to listen. This may sound unduly harsh but a review of
right to counsel decisions during the last decade leaves the firm impression
that, after the fact, judges tolerate representation they would not approve or
abide before the fact. Further, these decided cases raise a far more troublesome
concern for those cases which do not reach the courts. As to those, nothing will
ever be known precisely because postconviction relief is an ineffective tool for
shaping effective systems of defense.
These problems of systems, resources, and standards were confronted in
United States v. Chatman,4 where prosecutions were dismissed because there
were insufficient attorneys to effectively serve the overwhelming caseload in the
District of Columbia. The court rejected the postconviction "mockery of jus-
tice" standard for determining what is effective counsel, observing that "the
trial court's function is certainly more substantial than merely preventing a
trial from becoming a farce; a court cannot be blind to injustice occurring in
its presence."' 5 The court then removed counsel appointed previously since he
already had fifty-eight pending cases and had never "demonstrated any partic-
ular degree of diligence, legal acumen or perseverance in a host of prior ap-
pearances before the court."' But the court was frustrated in appointing new
counsel, since a standard of effectiveness implies a limitation on maximum
caseload, which by District of Columbia Public Defender Service Guidelines
had been set at thirty active cases or 120 felony cases annually. This had already
been exceeded by each member of the public defender staff. Of a panel of
10 This phrasing has been used countless times. See, e.g., United States v. Wight, 176
F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949); Wirth v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 1137, 1140-41 (D. Conn.
1972).
11 United States v. Bern, 476 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affirming conviction although
defense counsel "chose" not to call a favorable witness. See opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon).
12 See United States v. Jansen, 475 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1973) (affirming conviction
although defense counsel opened the door for damaging cross-examination) ; United States v.
Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973) (affirming conviction although defense counsel failed
to object early enough to preserve self-incrimination claims).
13 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250 (1969) ; and cases cited in note 12 supra.




thirty-four private attorneys available for that day,. only nineteen had appeared;
each had already been assigned two or three cases, although the Superior Court
coordinator "was unable to say whether any of these lawyers had any criminal
trial experience whatever."'
1
This is hardly atypical; what is different is that the Chatman court dis-
cussed the inadequacy of the system and resources openly, rather than masking
the problems by pro forma appointment of ineffective counsel. Rather than
dismiss prosecutions, most courts make such appointments, understanding full
well that the defendant is unlikely to be able to raise or prove ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. Even if he could, the standard which must be met is the
"mockery of justice" test on postconviction relief-an impossible barrier.
Another tool is needed to police the system and assure that Gideon is im-
plemented, not after the fact on a case-by-case basis but prospectively and sys-
tem-wide. Traditionally this has been approached as a legislative problem.
Following Gideon, the Allen Report" led to the federal Criminal Justice Act"
providing defender services in the federal courts. The states have followed with
varying models. Yet both the state and federal models have largely ignored
standards and goals for the quality of the services offered. This is equally true
of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice and the Na-
tional Advisory Commission's Standards and Goals.
What is missing are administrative criteria to enhance effective represen-
tation. Neither courts nor legislatures, however, have addressed the essential
administrative rule-making tasks of defining caseload, counsel assignments and
qualifications, services, eligibility, and procedure. This must be done for any
public service,"0 be it welfare, housing, police, or education. Yet the develop-
ment of administrative rules for criminal defense is curiously stunted.
Reasons are hard to find. Lawyers exercise skills and discretion in a manner
similar to other deliverers of public service and all are increasingly subject to
administrative controls.21 Courts promulgate rules concerning licensing and
conduct of attorneys. Perhaps the absence of detailed criteria governing effective-
ness of counsel can be explained by the traditional "volunteer" origins of public
defense. Perhaps courts still confuse public service with charity.
Concern has been limited to specific cases, as noted earlier, or to deficiencies
in legal education. Only in the summer of 1973 did there emerge a different
concern: the problems of public defense may flow not only from individual
attorneys or legal education but also from the model and method of delivering
public defense.
In Wallace v. Kern,2" Judge Judd of the United States District Court for
17 Id.
18 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963). The Commit-
tee was chaired by Professor Francis A. Allen of the University of Michigan School of Law and
its Report has been widely referred to and is hereafter cited as THE ALLEN REPORT.
19 18 U.S.C. § 3006A et seq. (1970).
20 See, e.g., Cahn and Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317 (1964); Cahn and Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 927 (1966).
21 See K. DAvIs, DisCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
22 No. 72-C-898 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 10, 1973).
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the Southern District of New York entertained a suit against the Legal Aid
Society of New York which provides indigent defense services. The issue was
whether the Society could provide effective services in view of personnel and
caseload limitations. Although summarily reversed" on the curious ground
that such services are not state action,24 Judge Judd's opinion is remarkable as
perhaps the first judicial attempt2 5 to deal prospectively with ineffective assistance
of counsel by altering the model and administration of the delivery system.
While the precise elements of the court's ruling will be discussed later,
two aspects of the opinion warrant special emphasis. First, the court noted that
the limited value of postconviction review justifies-indeed, necessitates-
prospective review of defense systems:
None of the reasons which support the imposition of strict standards
in postconviction cases is applicable in the posture in which the question
of adequate representation is presented here. The hesitancy to indulge in
second-guessing previously made decisions is not an obstacle. What is in
issue is not how to investigate, what plea to accept, which witnesses to
call, what defenses to put forward, how to examine and cross-examine, but
whether the Legal Aid attorneys are so overburdened that they cannot even
make the necessary decisions.
Although the court has determined that the adequacy of representation
by The Legal Aid Society may be measured by a different standard, the
postconviction cases are instructive on the components of constitutionally
sufficient representation. Lack of preparation, investigation, and consul-
tation are ubiquitous complaints in the adequate representation cases.2 6
Secondly, the court acknowledged the difficulties in setting manageable stand-
ards which could increase the probability of effective representation without
being arbitrary or mechanical. Yet it felt obligated to undertake the task and
competent to do so:
There are difficulties in fixing a maximum caseload, and what is too
high in one county may be manageable in another county. Some cases will
require much more time than others and some attorneys will have a different
mix of cases than others. Fixing an average caseload for Kings County and
permitting Legal Aid to make adjustments within that average is an appro-
priate way to deal with the problem.
The maximum set now may be different from what could be managed
if defendants did not stay in jail as long, if there were better facilities for
23 Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Gir. 1973).
24 See A. LAFRANcE ET AL., THE LAw OF THE PooR §§ 417-19 (1973). It seems odd, to
say the least, that an agency performing a public function for the state and serving the public's
constitutionally mandated needs is not acting under color of state law.
25 Cf. Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213, 221 (5th Cir. 1973), reversing one case of in-
effective assistance of counsel after the fact, and criticizing "the highly questionable prevailing
practice in the Baldwin Superior Court of routinely appointing a single resident attorney to
represent ten or more defendants at every Friday morning plea day without compensation."
See also United States v. Chatman, 42 U.S.L.W. 2593 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 7, 1974), dis-
missing prosecutions because the public defender staff was so overloaded it could not undertake
new cases.
26 Wallace v. Kern, supra note 22, Memorandum Opinion at 37. Accord, United States
v. Chatman, 42 U.S.L.W. 2593 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 7, 1974).
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interviews, if there were more adequate supporting services and if problems
of calendar control are resolved. The limit which the court fixes now may
be changed in the future if experience or changed circumstances justify.
Determination of the maximum caseload is complicated by the fact
that computations have been directed only to cases assigned to Parts,
excluding the critical period between preliminary hearing and indictment
and the period between guilty plea or verdict and sentence. Effective in-
vestigation need not wait for the return of an indictment, and on occasion
may even prevent the client from being indicted. With the digital system
which has been adopted, it should be possible for Legal Aid to assign a
case to an attorney before indictment, so that investigation can proceed
while trails and memories are fresh. Excluding cases awaiting sentence
from the caseload is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement for
advice of counsel at the time of sentence.
The court is convinced, and finds, that an average caseload of 40
felony indictments pending in a trial part strains the utmost capacity of a
Legal Aid attorney under existing conditions, that the present average
caseload is substantially in excess of that number, and that acceptances of
any additional felony indictments by Legal Aid would prevent it from
affording its existing clients their constitutional right to counsel.2 7
The court also discussed trial preparation and continuity of representation.
In each area, it dealt with the essentials of effective representation but did so
without impinging upon that realm reserved for the professional judgment of
defense counsel. The concern was rather for structure, process, and method, all
of which can be dealt with in objective, quantifiable terms. Quite simply, the
court in Wallace v. Kern acted much like any administrative agency: taking
evidence and establishing procedures to implement policy. Such an approach is
innovative, yet clearly indispensable to assure the promise of Gideon on a sys-
tem-wide basis.
This article pursues the same approach by delineating the elements of a
sound delivery system for public defense services, by presenting and evaluating"
available literature and present practices, and by suggesting areas of further
inquiry and financial investment. The objective is to develop effective and
manageable criteria for establishing the structure, method, and process of
delivering competent defense services. For comparison, this article will review
and evaluate the few previous attempts at such standards, including the Model
27 Wallace v. Kern, supra note 22, Memorandum Opinion at 37.
28 The author is an academic, but hopes that any resulting impediment to his credibility
may be reduced by his experience prior to entering law teaching in public defense covering some
six years in the urban criminal courts of two states. Three and one half of those years in-
volved full-time representation of indigents in Connecticut on charges ranging from breach of
the peace to murder. The author has also been a consultant to the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association; to the Office of Legal Services, Office of Economic Opportunity; and
to the Center for Criminal Justice at Boston University. Much of the research for this article
was done while the author was consulting for the Center. Although the views expressed here
are solely the author's, he does wish to express special gratitude for the helpful commentary
and criticism of Professor Sheldon Krantz, Director of the Center, and Charles Smith, The
Argersinger Project Director of the Center.
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Defender Act, the American Bar Association Standards on Defense Services,
and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals.
Most proposals and existing programs are deficient in several respects.
First, they are unfortunately tradition-bound, relating defense services to the
needs of the courts rather than clients and accepting such legalistic distinctions
as limiting services by what is a "felony" or what is "criminal." Second, they
adopt the middle-class model of privately retained counsel for defense of the
poor, ignoring the vastly different needs and strategies in serving the poor.
Thirdly, they view defense services as having only a limited reactive capability
and no ongoing obligation to effect law reform. Finally, most proposals and
programs are resigned to limited quality flowing from inadequate resources
rather than insisting upon the resources necessary for adequate criminal defense.
A concern for resources is particularly significant. With the decision in
Argersinger has come the need to re-examine the costs of delivering defense
services to the poor. This article analyzes and challenges errors and inade-
quacies in past practices and estimates. The author disagrees sharply with
the conservative estimates of most authorities and believes that the annual cost
of full and effective services following Argersinger will be much higher than
anticipated, in fact exceeding one billion dollars.
If this estimate is accurate, its implications are profound. It may dictate
finding new resources, such as federal financing, to fund defense in state pros-
ecutions. It may lend further impetus to the already legitimate arguments for
decriminalizing traffic, alcohol, and vice offenses. And it may lead to improve-
ment in the criminal justice system by pretrial diversion or elimination of in-
carceration for petty offenses. If so, the cost of effective representation can
be substantially minimized while at the same time reforming the criminal
justice system.
The danger is that none of these alternatives will be pursued. Resources
may remain inadequate. Services may continue to be ineffective. Errors will
continue to be hidden from view. And the system will continue to be masked
by the confusion and inefficiency of postconviction, case-by-case, after-the-fact
litigation concerning the effectiveness of counsel. This danger can be avoided
if courts and legislatures will take the initiative to promulgate standards govern-
ing the administration and quality of defense services.
At the same time, the courts must not involve themselves in the minutiae
of administering defense services. Such chores as determining eligibility or allo-
cating supporting services may properly be entrusted to a professional staff. The
model evolved in this article is similar to that used for delivering civil legal
services. The courts should set standards, not deliver services.
The author draws upon several years of full-time public defense work with
the New Haven Legal Assistance Association. The Association renders both
civil and criminal services through neighborhood offices. This unique experi-
ment has implemented many of the ideas urged in this article, including auton-
omy to determine eligibility and supporting services, caseload standards, merit
hiring and adequate compensation, latitude for the client to select his attorney,
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continuity of representation throughout the process, system reform and responsive-
ness to the client. Much of what has been done in New Haven recommends
itself for adoption elsewhere.
In the end, economy for court and counsel can be effected. The criminal
process can be made to operate as it should, fairly and expeditiously for pros-
ecution and defense. Most fundamentally, an adequate system of defense
services can assure what is now seriously in doubt: the ability of our criminal
processes to dispense justice.
II. The Place of Counsel
A. Fundamentals
While it would hardly seem necessary to undertake an extensive essay on
the value of counsel, its basic importance requires a brief review-largely in the
language of the Supreme Court-of the values placed upon and served by
counsel. It is not simply that an attorney may get an accused "off." Rather,
counsel is necessary because society has chosen the adversary process to seek
truth.2" If this is true of counsel generally, it is compellingly true of counsel
representing the poor. The latter are singularly ill-equipped by education and
status to represent themselves. This has been recognized consistently by the
Supreme Court in cases ranging from Argersinger back to Gideon:
. . . in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers
to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest
in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare
and present their defenses."
It has been recognized as long ago as Powell v. Alabama:
The right to be heard would, in many cases, be of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law...
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If
that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true it is of the ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.A'
Significantly, the guarantee of counsel announced in Gideon and Arger-
singer is a due process aspect of the fourteenth amendment. Counsel is im-
29 ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 2 (Approved Draft, 1968).
30 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
31 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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portant because of the right to a fair hearing. The presentation and cross-
examination of witnesses are tasks peculiarly for counsel 2 and indispensable to
the right to be heard. It is this right as an aspect of due process which makes
the place of counsel basic to our system of justice: the right to be heard.3
In Goldberg v. Kelley," the Supreme Court held that a hearing must be
conducted prior to termination of welfare benefits. Mr. Justice Brennan's
majority opinion recognized an important relationship between social policy,
poverty and the right to be heard:
[T]ermination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he
waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immedi-
ately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily
subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the
welfare bureaucracy.
Moreover, important governmental interests are promoted by affording
recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. From its founding the
Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well being of
all persons within its border. We have come to recognize that forces not
within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty . .. Public assis-
tance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to "promote the general Wel-
fare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The
same governmental interests which counsel the provisions of welfare, counsel
as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termina-
tion evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end.3 5
These are not only the very functions counsel performs in a criminal trial but
also the indispensable requisites of a minimally adequate exploration of facts and
contentions in any kind of a hearing. Significantly, Justice Brennan in Goldberg,
a welfare case, relied upon Powell v. Alabama, a criminal case, indicating the
pervasive quality of the right to be heard and the importance of counsel to that
right.
The Supreme Court has said that courts are the central peace-keeping in-
stitutions of our society. This is particularly true of our criminal courts which
deal directly with breaches of the public order, most often affecting the poor,
either as defendants or victims. Alienation of citizens, particularly of the poor,
from the values courts represent generates "frustration and hostility toward [the]
courts among the most numerous consumers of justice."3 " The urban riots of the
32 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
33 See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11-13 (1964).
34 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
35 Id. at 264-65. At a later point, the majority further held:
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre-
hend the right to be heard by counsel." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69
(1932). We do not say that counsel must be provided. at the pretermination hear-
ing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.
Counsel can Jelp delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly
manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interests of the
recipient. Id. at 270-71. [Emphasis supplied.]
36 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971).
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1960's and the Report of the Kerner Commission"' amply testify to this basc
truth.
Access to the courts and the values thus protected presuppose the avail-
ability of counsel. Counsel's value, then, is public even though he must act in
the private interest of his client."
B. Parity of Public and Private Counsel
The Supreme Court has noted many times the obvious point that private
individuals hire counsel to protect their interests, as does the public to prosecute
its interests. The poor need similar protection. It is thus commonplace for com-
mentators, courts, and statutes to speak in terms of parity between the affluent
and the poor when dealing with counsel. The Supreme Court in Douglas v.
California said that:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel...
while the indigent.., is forced to shift for himself.s9
As Justice Black observed in a passage frequently quoted from Griffin V. Illinois:
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has."4 0
Section 2(a) (1) of the Model Public Defender Act provides that "A needy
person is entitled to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person
having his own counsel." He is also to be "counseled and defended at all stages
of the matter beginning with the earliest time when a person providing his own
counsel would be entitled . . ." and provided with "necessary services and
facilities of representation (including investigation and other preparation)."
Despite this prescription of equality, some are more equal than others. Few
seriously urge precise equality between the poor and the affluent. Indeed, there
is not even genuine equality among the affluent. In Douglas v. California, the
Supreme Court added to the language quoted above that "Absolute equality is
not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often support them. ' 41 The
Commentary to the American Bar Association Defense Function Standards42
37 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIO-
LENCE (1968). (Hereinafter referred to as the KERNER COMMISSION REPORT.)
38 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 52 (1967). (Hereinafter referred to as TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTS.)
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement concluded that:
The importance of counsel also proceeds from values transcending the interest of
any individual defendant. Counsel is needed to maintain effective and efficient
criminal justice. Ours is an adversary system of justice, which depends for its vitality
upon vigorous and proper challenges to assertions of governmental authority and
accusations of crime. Reliance upon the judge or prosecutor to protect the inter-
ests of defendants is an inadequate substitute for the advocacy of conscientious
defense counsel. Id.
39 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
40 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
41 372 U.S. at 357 (1963).
42 § 3.9 (Approved Draft, 1971).
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seems often more concerned with preventing defense counsel from doing more
for an indigent client than he would for a private client. Society has committed
itself to something less than what the wealthy can purchase, but the standard for
measuring that lesser commitment remains unclear.
At appropriate points later4" in this article, the diminished status of public
defense counsel will be reviewed in depth. Public defense counsel usually have
less experience and income and fewer staff than their private counterparts. Never-
theless, they have heavier caseloads. Not surprisingly, every study concludes-
although the reasons given vary-that public defense clients fare worse than the
wealthy: fewer trials, more findings of guilty, and more severe sentences.
This lesser commitment to the poor unfortunately aggravates the pre-existing
hazards facing them in the criminal process. Some 30 to 70 percent of all
defendants cannot afford counsel." They often cannot afford bail" and bail
reform, in the view of some commentators, has been largely ineffectual. 6 Those
denied bail plead guilty more often, go to jail more often, and stay there longer47
This applies to the poor generally, although to a lesser degree, whether or not
released prior to trial.48 From arraignment to sentencing, from initial bail to
ultimate fine' or imprisonment, the poor cannot afford the price of justice.
Corrective provisions are limited. Most jurisdictions now provide counsel in
criminal prosecutions and appeals.5" Counsel, on occasion, is also available in
federal civil rights actions,"' in habeas corpus actions, 2 in actions under the
federal in. forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,"3 and in some state court
43 See Part IV, Section C infra.
44 See Solomon, This New Fetish for Indigency, 66 COLUM. L. Rxv. 248, 261 (1966);
Bing and Rosenfeld, The Quality of Justice: In the Lower Criminal Courts of Metropolitan
Boston, 7 CRim. L. BULL. 393, 422 (1971). (Hereinafter referred to as Bing and Rosenfeld.)
45 The landmark studies of bail are Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I
and II, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 1125 (1965); and Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate
Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 631 (1964). See also Comment, Pretrial
Release, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1339 (1972); Botein, The Manhattan Bail Project: Its Impact on
Criminology and the Criminal Law, 43 TExAs L. REv. 319 (1965).
46 Bogomony and Sonnenreich, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Administrative Tail
Wagging and Other Legal Problems, 11 ARiuz. L. Rav. 201 (1969); but see Oaks and Lehman,
The Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent Defendant, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 584,
666-78 (hereinafter referred to as Oaks & Lehman), recommending California's citation
system; Comment, supra note 45; note, An Alternative to the Bail System: Penal Code Section
853.6, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (1967).
47 The Unconstitutional Administration of Bail, 8 CPim. L. BULL. 459, 460 (1972). Rice,
Bail and the Administration of Bail in the State of Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1971);
Bing and Rosenfeld, supra note 44; Comment, The Bail Reform Act of 1966, 53 IowA L. Ray.
170, 171 (1967); Paulsen, Pre-Trial Release in the United States, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 109
(1966).
48 See Summers, The Tilted Scales of Criminal Justice: The Plight of the Indigent
Defendant, 5 C~im. L. BULL. 508 (1969).
49 See Note, Fining the Indigent, 71 COLUmN. L. Ray. 1281 (1971); Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
50 But see Ross v. Moffit, 414 U.S. 909 (1973), holding that there is no constitutional
right to counsel in discretionary appeals to a state's Supreme Court after an appeal as of right
to a state's intermediate appellate court.
51 United States v. Steward, 451 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1971) (prisoners' rights); Petet
v. Consolidated Freightways, 313 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Tex. 1970) (sex discrimination).
52 See Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971).
53 See Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1270 (1966);
Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967); Note, The
Right to Civil Counsel, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1322 (1966).
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proceedings.54 Fees and bonds may be waived for trials"5 and for criminal ap-
peals.5" Transcripts may be provided without charge prior to trial' and on ap-
peal,5" at least where alternative means of presenting a point for appeal are un-
available.59 Expert or investigational assistance may also be available." How-
ever, in the absence of clear constitutional or statutory authorization, most courts
have held that they can do little to help the poor, even to the extent of refusing
to waive fees."
The message remains clear: the criminal justice system exacts a heavy price
of indigent defendants and the limited value of most corrective measures increases
the importance of providing effective defense counsel. A minimal touchstone
must be parity with retained counsel. In Wallace v. Kern, the District Court
returned to this theme persistently, criticizing the frequent departures from the
procedures of retained counsel with respect to interviewing, counseling, con-
tinuity of representation, and caseload. This disparity has been noted elsewhere'2
and its implications are discussed in detail later.
It is important to emphasize the significance of the Model Defendant Act's
seemingly bland prescription of parity. It admittedly does not reflect the present
reality but rather calls for revolutionary, fundamental, essential changes. As an
operating principle of administration, however, it is dear, concise, and man-
ageable, and emphasizes the seminal concept of counsel's role, whether retained
or appointed.
Parity must be the beginning point of any public defense system. This
means parity not only in the model of defense services but also in the availability
of supporting services.
C. Parity of Defense Seruices
The Model Defender Act notes the importance of "necessary services and
facilities" for public defense. Public counsel need expert services and their higher
caseloads compel economy through more extensive use of paraprofessionals and
54 Oregon v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 157 (1968) (parental rights); In Re
Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148 (1968) (civil arrest); Hotel Martha Washington v.
Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1971) (landlord-tenant).
55 There are rarely trial fees in criminal cases, although filing fees are common in civil
litigation. See generally Comment, Access to the Civil Courts: The Need for Continuing
Reform, 37 ALBANY L. Rnv. 135 (1972); Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of
Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 253 (1968); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden
Barrier to the Indigent, 56 Gao. L.J. 516 (1968). Waiver may be appropriate under a
statute, as with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or the Constitution. See Boddie v. 'Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971).
56 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma
Pauperis Appeals, 43 F.R.D. 343 (1967).
57 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
58 Tate v. United States, 359 F.2d 245, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
59 Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
60 Note, An Indigent's Right to Pre-Trial Technical Assistance, 8 IDAHo L. Rnv. 188
(1971); People v. Watson, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966). The Criminal Justice Act
makes provision for such assistance, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1970).
61 See Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons
in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. L. REv. 21 (1967); Comment, Access of Indigents into, the Civil Court-
room, 49 N.C. L. Rav. 683 (1971). But cf. O'Connor v. Matzdorf, 76 Wash.2d 589, 458 P.2d
154 (1969); Martin v. Alameda County Superior Court, 168 P. 135 (Cal. 1917).
62 See, e.g., Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973).
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investigators. Tis requires a higher volume of supporting services per attorney
and perhaps even more supporting services per case. The poor are less sophisti-
cated, are financially less able to assist in investigation and have a higher in-
cidence of emotional or psychiatric disorders. Anyone familiar with public
criminal defense will attest that the poor bring special problems to the already
considerable problems of defense.
The A.B.A. Standards on Defense Servicess' provide that the defender
program should have "investigatory, expert and other services necessary to an
adequate defense." The limitation to "necessary" services appears in the Model
Defender Act, other proposals,"5 and the Criminal Justice Act.66 The Criminal
Justice Act does not limit the accused to an "adequate" defense, as do the A.B.A.
Standards, but instead imposes a limit of $1000, increased from the previous
level of $300. Either approach poses a potentially significant handicap not
encountered by the wealthy in preparing a defense.
One possible solution is that adopted by the Model Public Defender Act.
It contains the usual provisions concerning assistance. It then adds67 that the
Defender-General may use any facilities available to the prosecution. This at
least assures parity and availability of resources. It falls short, however, in that
the prosecution's resources may be inadequate for the defense of a particular case.
Further, sharing of resources may cause disclosure of privileged information.
Limiting services to those "necessary" for preparing a defense clearly may
be interpreted unsympathetically to the defense. Moreover, what is "necessary"
often cannot be predicted. The ultimate value of a line of inquiry may appear
only in hindsight. Only a lawyer's intuition or imagination may be available to
justify use of experts or investigators. In any event, a judge can hardly decide
what is "necessary." He is removed from the raw facts of the developing case
and his consideration of defense needs in open court may lead to undesirable
disclosure of defense strategy. 8
In general, the federal courts have been fairly liberal under the Criminal
Justice Act in allowing supporting services of counsel.69 In contrast, only four-
teen states provide for services in addition to counsel.7" These impose varying
limits as to the kinds of cases or the dollar amounts. Some allow only "reason-
able" supporting services.7 There are, of course, constitutional overtones to
limitations on supporting services for public defense counsel. Due process pre-
63 [Footnote omitted.]
64 Supra note 29, at § 1.5.
65 See, e.g., § 6(a) (2) of the proposed bill in Anderson, Defense of Indigents In Maine:
The Need for Public Defenders, 25 ME. L. Rav. 1 (1973). (Hereinafter cited as Anderson.)
66 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1970).
67 Model Public Defender Act § 8.
68 At a minimum, the standard should be that used in United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp.
234 (D. Neb. 1966):
The rule in allowing defense services is that the judge need only be satisfied that
they reasonably appear necessary to assist counsel in their preparation, not that the
defense would be defective without such testimony. Id. at 241.
69 Comment, Assistance in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 16 VLL. L.
REv. 323 (1970); see also United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968) (hand-
writing expert); United States v. Tate, 419 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1969) (psychiatrist).
70 Bowman, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational
Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 6 Custm. L. BULL. 491, 495 (1970).
71 Id.
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supposes effective advocacy. Equal protection presupposes parity. The assurance
of counsel assumes some level of effective counsel.7" The Allen Report, in a
much-quoted passage, observed:
It follows that insofar as the financial status of the accused impedes vigorous
and proper challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viability of the ad-
versary system . . . It is also clear that a situation in which persons are re-
quired to contest a serious accusation but are denied access to the tools of
contest is offensive to fairness and equity.
73
Some courts have held that refusal to make experts available to the defense
does not violate due process if the state's expert is available.7' Other courts have
simply denied application for expert assistance, without any attempt at rationali-
zation.7" The trend since Gideon appears to favor state provision of expert and
investigative services. A contrary approach would hardly seem tenable.
76
Supporting services should generally come from people employed by the
defender program. Investigators should be full-time employees while experts,
however, may be retained on a case-by-case basis. An optimum ratio would be
one investigator for three full-time attorneys and one secretary for two full-time
attorneys, to be appropriately adjusted in assigned-counsel systems.7  At the
present time, it is estimated that 83 percent of all public defenders have no in-
vestigators.7 ' Even where state, police, or prosecution agencies provide persons
such as psychiatrists, social workers, toxicologists, chemists, and fingerprint and
ballistic experts, the defense should be free to purchase its own supporting
services. This assures the adversarial advantage of partisan experts as well as
avoiding such serious problems as self-incrimination and conflicts of interest.
Arguably, supporting services are less necessary with misdemeanant than
with felony representation. Yet misdemeanor prosecutions often deal with
deviant problems which perhaps should never come into the criminal process.
Alcoholics, vagrants, homosexuals, and distraught spouses may need experts to
establish defenses or develop diversionary alternatives to prosecution. To the
72 Id. at 498-502. See also Comment, supra note 69, at 338-46.
73 THE ALLEN REPORT, supra note 18, at 10-11.
74 E.g., McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951). See also Lewin, Indigency-
Informal and Formal Procedures to Provide Partisan Psychiatric Assistance to the Poor, 52
IowA L. REv. 458 (1966), concluding that there is no constitutional right to a partisan
expert if the State makes the same expert available to both sides.
75 See 'Comment, An Indigent's Right to Pre-Trial Technical Assistance-People versus
Watson and the Discretionary Approach, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 188 (1971) and cases discussed
therein.
76 See, e.g., Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Robinson
v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691 (7thCir. 1965); State v. Taylor, 202 Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968);
People v. Watson, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966). The New Jersey Supreme Court
observed in State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1966):
The constitutional obligation to furnish counsel to an indigent can sensibly only
be construed to include as well that which is necessary to a proper defense in
addition to the time and professional efforts of an attorney and we have no doubt
of the inherent power of a court to require such to be provided at public expense.
Id. at 534, 170 A.2d at 9.
77 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PRESCRIPTIVE
PROGRAM PACKAGE 78 (1974). (Hereinafter referred to as IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A
PRESCRIPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE.)
78 NATIONAL LEGAL Ail AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 70-77
(1974). (Hereinafter referred to as THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE.)
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extent that misdemeanor prosecutions are used as a means of social control, they
pose unique problems for investigators and opportunities for expert witnesses.
Of course, many misdemeanors pose the same problems, such as handwriting,
ballistics and psychiatry, for experts as do felony prosecutions.
Argersinger, in expanding the right to counsel, has thus posed substantial
problems concerning effective counsel to the extent that effectiveness requires
supporting services. No commentator has attempted to estimate the scope or cost
of such services. However, if there are 5,000,000 misdemeanor prosecutions an-
nually and if one third are of the "social nuisance" variety,"' a substantial de-
mand is posed for expert assistance from psychologists, psychiatrists and social
workers concerning the treatment and treatability of alcoholics, ° sexual deviates,
drug addicts8 and other nonconformists. If another third82 of misdemeanors
consists of property, violence and drug-related offenses, the need for expertise
can be expected to be roughly the same as with most felonies.
Courts and legislatures must therefore be particularly alert to the need for
supporting services and the procedures for affording them. The most effective
approach would be to provide an ample budget to be expended in the discretion
of the defender staff or the appointed counsel.83 This is, after all, the approach
with the administration of most public services and funds. Defense counsel
should not have to apply for supporting services on a case-by-case basis. After
the fact accounting, as with any public funds, may be appropriate, but the
delays and difficulties in litigating the need for services prior to expenditure
militate against a courtroom, adversary inquiry into what is essentially an admin-
istrative matter.
The prosecution in reality has no more standing to complain of defense
expenditures than does the defense concerning prosecution investment in investi-
gation or retention of experts. Judges have no particular expertise in this area.
Too often, hearings on defense needs for services become simply an occasion for
harassment or embarrassment of adversaries. A better solution is to recognize the
urgent need for supporting services, allocate an appropriate sum to the defender
agency, and then assign adminstrative responsibility to them.
D. Reform of the System
The preceding commentary has presupposed two generally accepted proposi-
tions: counsel is needed in the justice system to establish the truth in particular
cases and the system unfairly discriminates against the poor from arrest through
sentencing. The latter has been the uniform conclusion of the most significant
studies of the justice system in the last decade: the Allen Report, the Kerner
Commission, and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement. None of
these, however, has fully examined the implications for the role of defense
counsel for the poor in reforming the system.
79 See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 55.
80 See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
81 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
82 See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 55-56.
83 See Mason v. Arizona, 360 F. Supp. 56, 57-58 (D. Ariz. 1973).
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The poor have little voice in the legislative process and lack the funds
necessary to control elections. If they are to influence a criminal process which
disproportionately affects them, they must be afforded an advocate. Defense
counsel therefore assumes unique importance as an instrument of reform for
them.
A defense system for indigents cannot simply be defensive. It has affir-
mative corrective responsibilities within a proper system of justice. It should not
simply respond to prosecutions brought by another agency. The defense system
has the responsibility to change laws, policies, and practices governing itself
and the criminal process. It should propose legislation, take appeals, and bring
civil litigation. Initiative should be the style of a defense agency and reform a
part of its responsibility. A unit of staff attorneys must be so charged.
Most public defender statutes and the A.B.A. Standards do not recognize
this. They simply extend to the poor some of the traditional legal services avail-
able to the middle class on a case-by-case basis. They fail to recognize that
such services inadequately deal with the massive systemic problems of the poor
and that a well-funded, well-staffed defender agency has capabilities and respon-
sibilities beyond those of a private lawyer retained for a single matter.
This is an unfamiliar concept but not wholly new. The Legal Defense
Fund of the N.A.A.C.P. in the early 1960's recognized the racial and economic
biases of the criminal process and undertook the defense of many criminal cases
which had law reform potential. Their success has been substantial, most
recently leading to Supreme Court invalidation of the death penalty.14 The
American Civil Liberties Union has a record of activity and success in defending
criminal cases which antedates that of the N.A.A.C.P., in areas ranging from
political belief to freedom of expression to, most recently, abortion" and birth
control. Historically, from the time of William Penn 8 to Eugene V. Debs to the
freedom riders and the draft-card burnerss and down to Benjamin Spock, 8
defense of criminal prosecutions has been an accepted mode of changing crimi-
nal laws.
The need is even dearer today. The past decades have seen an expanding
criminalization of previously noncriminal acts involving, among other things,
drugs, motor vehicles, and credit arrangements. Simultaneously, police resources
and discretion have steadily expanded. At the same time, deviant behavior has
proliferated, ranging from political protests to welfare and rent strikes, gay
liberation, and the entire drug culture. These developments are all of particular
importance, in varying ways, to the poor and compound the old, persistent
vices of discriminatory enforcement of vague, duplicative statutes. The resulting
need for comprehensive reform is evidenced by the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code and the Reports of the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws.
To a limited extent, the law reform potential and responsibility of defense
84 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
85 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86 See the opinion of Justice Douglas in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351-57 (1970).
87 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
88 See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (lst Cir. 1969).
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counsel have found expression in proposals concerning defense service. For
example, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice recently recom-
mended defense services which incorporate both full-time and assigned counsel.
The Commission acknowledged that an argument could be made that full-time
public defenders are "more likely to work for new laws or procedures to benefit
defendants." 9 The Commission observed that broad participation by the bar
might also have salutary consequences in reforming the system." Similarly,
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement concluded:
The significance of having able defense counsel goes beyond the im-
portance of providing effective representation. Experience has shown that
when good lawyers are brought into criminal practice, their impact is felt
far beyond the cases they handle. They ask questions and put pressure on
everyone in the system to examine what he is doing and why. They organize
reform and become a meaningful force for change.91
While most public defender statutes do not reflect a consciousness of the
law reform responsibility and potential of public counsel, at least one legislative
proposal requires the public defender to prepare reports including "changes in
the criminal law, and changes in court rules as may be appropriate to the im-
provement of criminal justice, the control of crime, the rehabilitation of offenders
and other related objectives."9 "
Yet the view in criminal representation of the poor probably remains that
expressed by Chief Justice Burger: "I think we must view the law reform func-
tion of public defenders as a very happy and very important by-product but,
nevertheless, a by-product.""
This is all in curious contrast to the provision of legal services to the poor
in civil cases. The Office of Economic Opportunity early adopted and has
consistently pursued a policy recognizing the unique legal problems of the poor
and the consequent special responsibility of counsel to change offending laws
and practices. This is reflected in the Guidelines for Legal Services Programs,
which provide:
Advocacy of appropriate reforms in statutes, regulations, and administrative
practices is a part of the traditional role of the lawyer and should be among
the services afforded by the program. This may include judicial challenge
to particular practices and regulations, research into conflicting or dis-
criminating applications of laws or administrative rules, and proposals for
administrative and legislative changes."
This emphasis on law reform has led to some conflict in the political arena 5
89 Commentary to Standard 13.5.
90 Id.
91 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs at 57.
92 § 2, Public Defender Bill, Appendix to Anderson, supra note 65.
93 Burger, The Role of Appointed Counsel in Criminal Cases, REPORT OF THE PRO-
CEEDINOS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE 41, 43 (1969).
94 Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 8700.36 (1973).
95 See, e.g., Pearson, To Protect the Rights of the Poor: The Legal Services Corporation
Act of 1971, 19 KAN. L. REV. 641 (1971); Finman, ORO Legal Services Programs and the
Pursuit of Social Change, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 1001.
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and considerable success in the courts.9 This approach would be equally valid
in criminal representation.
Law reform need not be at the expense of clients. Indeed, that danger
more properly applies to existing conceptions of counsel which pursue defense
strictly on a case-by-case basis. The result is a revolving-door approach to
justice, with the same problems and the same clients returning time and again
because no one takes the responsibility to seek new solutions. Law reform
counsel can advocate broad-gauge solutions on behalf of the indigent defendants.
A law reform orientation would require a new structure, similar to that of
the civil legal services programs, which can develop ongoing policies, with its
autonomy limited only by responsibility to its clientele not to court bureauc-
racies or outmoded concepts of the roles of lawyers. A defense system must
serve clients, not "handle cases." This means abandoning the distinction be-
tween civil and criminal and providing a full range of legal services to an eligible
client through one office 97-- preferably through one attorney. This means earlier
and sufficient legal services for each client across a broader spectrum of inter-
related problems. It assures a more satisfying role for the attorney and a higher
degree of client confidence. 8 Again, the New Haven neighborhood office ap-
proach of rendering both civil and criminal services through an autonomous,
nonprofit agency recommends itself.
The role of the courts and legislatures in this area is crucial. They must
first recognize and develop effective administrative structures for delivering
defense services. This can be done in part by court rule-making but also requires
the cooperation of legislative and budgetary bodies. Secondly, the courts must
withdraw from actual administration. The professionals themselves must deter-
mine such matters as eligibility, the need for supporting services, preparation
of defenses, and allocation of resources, including those for law reform. The
courts should supervise the framework and screen the results but not themselves
deliver the services. Law reform presupposes independence from the system
to be changed.
III. Forms of Defense Systems:
Assigned Counsel and Public Defenders
It is customarily said that there are two modes of delivering legal services
to the poor: public defender offices and assigned counsel.9 While this is a
useful distinction, it is important to note that each type has endless variations.
Most criticisms of each type are consequently simplistic and do not relate to
inherent unavoidable deficiencies.
96 See, e.g., LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut,
1971 DuxE L.J. 487; LaFrance, Federal Litigation for the Poor, 1972 L. Soc. ORDER 1. The
courts have not viewed law reform efforts with a wholly sanguine eye, however. See Stumpf &
Janowitz, Judges and the Poor: Bench Responses to Federally Financed Legal Services, 21
STAN. L. Rnv. 1058, 1072 (1969).
97 This is done in a number of communities through varying mechanisms. New Haven is
an example. See J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JusTI cE (1972). (Hereinafter cited as
CASPER.)
98 See CASPER, supra note 97.
99 See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPoRT: THE CoURTs at 59.
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Assigned counsel systems are in use in approximately two-thirds of the
counties of the United States.0 0 These systems usually involve court appoint-
ment of counsel, sometimes from attorneys in court but preferably from sys-
tematically established panels. When a panel is involved, the client is occasion-
ally given a choice as to the attorney who will represent him.'' Public defender
offices, in contrast, are staffed by attorneys who devote their full time to criminal
defense of the poor. Court appointment is frequently not necessary and staff
selection is done by the governing agency, often a court or board of directors.0 2
Most studies conclude that assigned counsel systems are appropriate, if at
all, in communities of less than 400,000.103 Above that figure, problems of
appointment, supervision and expense, it is said, argue for a full-time defender
office.'04 Even those who favor assigned counsel systems concede the need for
improved administration, supervision and evaluation." 5 Those who criticize
assigned counsel systems, apart from reasons of cost, usually do so on the basis
that administrative involvement of judges is at best unwieldy, 08 permitting
discrimination and favoritism, and leading to inexperienced or inept repre-
sentation."0 7
Criticisms concerning inefficiency and cost, however, often fail to withstand
analysis. For example, one criticism of assigned counsel systems is that they
assign only one case to an attorney. This may lead to several attorneys waiting
in court instead of just one or two. "' This need not lead to an increase in cost,
however, if a fixed fee per case is paid. Further, this criticism ignores the very
real value of having several attorneys present in a criminal courtroom, as wit-
nesses to what occurs and what needs changing. It ignores the problem faced
in most jurisdictions where a public defender might have to be in several courts
at one time; public defender offices, consequently, frequently adopt "assembly-
line" approaches. The ability of assigned counsel systems to assure that only
one attorney handles a particular case through all stages may be a distinct
virtue.
°0 9
Another frequent criticism of assigned counsel systems is cost. However,
below a certain level there may not be enough cases to occupy an attorney's
full talents or time. A public defender system would then be more expensive
100 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES 15 (1965). (Hereinafter
referred to as SILVERSTEIN.)
101 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 59.
102 See Part IV, Section C infra.
103 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 59; SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 18-23,
27-28, 63; N.L.A.D.A., New Standards, 24 LEG. AmD BRIEFCASE, 61, 66 (1965).
104 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 60; SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 63; Bird,
The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in Kentucky, 53 Ky. L.J. 478, 517-30
(1965); Comment, Legal Aid for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 18 VAND. L. REv. 837
(1965).
105 See, e.g., Summers, Defending the Poor: The Assigned Counsel System in Milwaukee
County, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 525, 537.
106 See, e.g., Lewin, A Tale of Two Districts, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 528, 556 (1968);
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE 89-97 (1969).
107 See Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District
Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv. 579, 596 (1963); IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PRESCRIPTIVE
PROGRAM PACKAGE at 38-41.
108 See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE 98
(1969). (Hereinafter cited as DEFENDER CONFERENCE REPORT.)
109 See Part IV, Section B infra.
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than assigned counsel. For example, one study has recommended that a full-
time public defender would be inappropriate in a federal district which has
fewer than 300 appointments per year."' Where volume is high enough to
justify either an assigned counsel or public defender system, several commentators
favor the latter upon considerations of cost. A study in North Carolina found
that public defender systems were less expensive in districts where caseloads
exceeded 250."' Below that point, assigned counsel were less expensive per
case.
Another study of a system in a different state found the cost per case was
$150 for assigned counsel, but only $50 for public defenders." 2 In New Jersey,
the cost per case for public defender services is reportedly $175, but for assigned
counsel it is $278."' A study for the state of Maine concluded that an adequate
defender system might cost $400,000, but that an assigned counsel system would
cost nearly $600,000.1" It has been estimated that assigned counsel systems
would lead to a national cost of $30,000,000 to $40,000,000 annually for all
indigent felony defendants." 5 Public defenders might cost approximately
$20,000,000."1
These studies are of dubious value since the methodology and data are
often unreliable. The comparisons often fail to note, for example, that the
higher figure for assigned counsel includes overhead expenses, while the figures
given for a public defender often do not. Nor do these comparisons note that
in mixed public defender-assigned counsel systems, such as New Jersey, assigned
counsel are used only because the cost of public defenders (e.g., in rural areas)
would be far greater. More importantly, the lower cost per case in public
defender programs is achieved by dividing their caseloads into their cost, an
approach which ignores the excessively high caseload level and the resulting low-
quality level. If defender caseloads were cut in half, as recommended later in
this article, the cost per case would be roughly equivalent to that in assigned
counsel systems. By comparison, the most that can be said after five years of
intensive debate over civil legal services to the poor is that the costs per case of
assigned counsel ("Judicare") and full-time counsel are so close as to make the
cost dispute virtually irrelevant."' That observation would seem equally true of
defense services."'
The real issue then is not cost but quality. There have been some attempts
to evaluate the relative performances of assigned counsel and public defenders.
110 See Oaks, The Criminal Justice Act in the Federal District Courts-A Summary and
Postscript, 7 Am. Clmu. L.Q. 210, 217-18 (1969).
111 See Comment, Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel and Public Defender
Systems, 49 N.C. L. REv. 705, 709-12 (1971).
112 Partman, The Necessity for an Organized Defender Office, DEFENDER CONFERENCE
R.EPORT at 55.
113 THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 36.
114 Anderson, supra note 65, at 17.
115 Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IowA L. Rnv. 1249,
1263 (1970).
116 Id.
117 See Preloznik, Wisconsin Judicare: An Experiment in Legal Services, 57 A.B.A.J. 1179
(1971); Robb, Alternate Legal Assistance Plans, 14 CATH. LAWYER 127 (1968).
118 These and other aspects of client service are considered in the following, portions of
this discussion.
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As might be expected, the results are inconclusive due to the multitude of factors
which comprise effective representation in criminal cases.1 19 Some raw statistics
suggest that assigned counsel clients plead guilty less often than public defender
clients, but disparity of averages within assigned counsel systems is great and
results are inconsistent. 2 ° Oaks and Lehman's study in Cook County indicated
that dismissals were obtained by retained counsel in 29 percent of their cases,
in 8 percent by the public defender, and in 6 percent by assigned ("com-
mittee") counsel; similar results obtained with guilty pleas. 21 In another study
in Milwaukee, assigned counsel did better in terms of dismissals, guilty pleas,
trials, and sentencings than public defenders in Minneapolis.'22 A study in
North Carolina found public defenders to be more effective than assigned
counsel in terms of dismissals, acquittals, sentences, and trials.'
Such studies are of marginal value. Often the differences between assigned
counsel and public defenders are statistically insignificant and may flow from
causes other than the type of system involved. For example, the differences in
results between assigned counsel and public defender systems are no greater
than the differences between different applications of each system. Some as-
signed counsel systems are better than others, and some are clearly as good as
public defender offices. The reverse is also true. One study not surprisingly
indicates that an assigned counsel system can deliver excellent services if it is
free from political influence, pays an adequate rate, affords adequate time for
preparation and-perhaps surprisingly-draws from the general bar." In
this study, a county system lacking these qualities rendered significantly poorer
services in terms of dismissals, acquittals, trials and sentencings." 5
The problems of defining and reporting results also raise serious questions
as to the validity of comparisons across jurisdictions using different defense sys-
tems. Even more basic, studies framed in terms of dismissals, acquittals, sen-
tencing and the like may ignore other values of defense systems, such as broad-
based involvement of the bar and reform of the criminal justice system. Assigned
counsel systems offer the potential of broad involvement of the bar and direct
tapping of the full pool of legal resources. Public defender systems hold the
potential for flexibility and expertise. Both systems appear desirable, and most
proposals suggest a combination of the two."s This is true of the Model De-
fender Act'2 7 which establishes a system of full-time defenders, complemented by
assigned counsel, with a further option for contracting with private legal services
programs. It is truer still of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
119 See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 70-73.
120 Id. at 23-25, 70-73.
121 Oaks and Lehman, supra note 46.
122 Summers, Defending the Poor: The Assigned Counsel System in Milwaukee County,
1969 Wis. L. REv. 525, 536.
123 Comment, Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel and Public Defender
Systems, 49 N.C. L. R.v. 705, 714-15 (1971).
124 Kittel, Defense of the Poor: A Study in Public Parsimony and Private Poverty, 45 IND.
L.J. 90 (1970).
125 Id. at 104.
126 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 65; Note, Implementing the Right to Counsel in New
Jersey--A Proposed Defender System, 20 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 789, 819-20 (1966); ImPLEMENT-
ING ARGERSINGER: A PRESCRIPTIVE PROGRAm PACKAGE at 45-47.
127 Sections 10 and 13.
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Justice, which urges that a panel of private attorneys work with full-time de-
fenders and assume a "significant" percentage of the caseload.'28 The allocation
is calculated to "encourage significant participation by the private bar in the
criminal justice system."' 29 The New Jersey Public Defender Act emphasizes
the role of full-time attorneys but also provides a place for appointed counsel.
It allows for retention of private counsel to provide "some special experience
or skill not available on the professional staff" or to meet caseload or conflict
of interest demands.'
It should be emphasized that courts and other planning agencies are already
familiar with both assigned counsel and public defender systems. To a large
extent, courts are in a position to dictate which system will be used. For example,
a rule requiring that only one attorney represent a client throughout his case
will necessitate some use of assigned counsel. In contrast, a rule authorizing
public representation prior to presentment in court necessitates a semiauton-
omous public defender office. Significantly each rule relates to both the quality
and the administration of service. In light of these dual implications of rule-
making, courts should consider the factors developed in the next section.
What becomes apparent is that the debate concerning assigned counsel
and public defenders obscures other issues concerning what characteristics
should be embodied in any defense system. These will be determined in part
by the private interest of clients in results but also by the public interest in costs,
law reform, and adequate service. Effectuating these interests requires less
attention to the form and more attention to the elements of defense systems.
IV. Elements of Defense Systems
A. Statewide Uniformity
The studies previously discussed concerning assigned counsel systems uni-
formly emphasize the lack of uniformity. While this may be a healthy form of
diversity, more often it is simply the product of a lack of standards. Differing
criteria may be employed within a single jurisdiciton-indeed, within a single
court-on such important matters as eligibilty, the time of appointing counsel,
and the availability of supporting services. A statute should provide for a state-
wide administrative board to set uniform, state-wide standards concerning such
matters as eligibility, caseload, systems, and resolution of grievances. The A.B.A.
Commentary' does not emphasize state-wide standards, although it calls
128 See Commentary to Standard 13.5.
129 Id.
130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 158A-9 (1971). Significantly, the Act adds that:
To achieve a proper balance between the services to be provided pursuant to this
act and the efficiency of the operation as a whole, as well as to stimulate the con-
tinual development of professional experience and interest in the administration of
criminal justice, the Public Defender shall divide the case workload of the office
between the professional staff and the trial pool or pools. Id.
131 Section 1.3 of the ABA STANDARDS oF DEFENSE SERVICES provides for uniformity
only within local subdivisions of a state:
By statute each jurisdiction should require the appropriate local subdivision to
adopt a plan for the provision of counsel. The statute should permit the local sub-
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for a state-wide statute. Some role for local administration is necessary but
allocation of resources and setting of standards is best done upon a uniform
state-wide basis. This is coming to be the experience and approach in other
vital public services, such as education and welfare. Defense services in response
to a state-wide system of criminal laws and procedures should be rendered pur-
suant to state-wide standards, funding, and administration.
This may not be self-evident. Views of the responsibilities and duties of
defense counsel vary widely among the bench and bar and any system which
does not limit such variety is open to prejudice and caprice. Such issues as
financial eligibility, time and mode of appointment, the need for experts, and
the adequacy of representation are often the subject of bitter courtroom dis-
agreements with judges or prosecutors. The result may vary from judge to
judge, depending upon each one's social philosophy. Rural courts often take
quite different approaches from urban courts. In states where judges "ride
circuit," policies within one judicial district or even one courtroom may vary
from day to day or month to month. Without state-wide standards there is
little opportunity for control or administrative review."3 2
The right to counsel is too important to be left to low-visibility discretion.
To the extent judges, clerks, prosecutors or defenders determine the meaning
of counsel, their conduct should be subject to review. The more diffused the
responsibility, the greater becomes the need for standards. A public defender
system may achieve some degree of consistency by state-wide office directives;
an assigned counsel system clearly needs rule-making by a board or other admin-
istrative body.
B. Program Autonomy
Program autonomy is clearly an important element of defense services. It
would make uniform standards and central administration possible, thereby
eliminating one of the major failings of assigned counsel systems. It would also
reduce apparent identity with the state which prosecutes the accused, a per-
sistent criticism of public defender systems.'
It is difficult for an accused to believe that the authority prosecuting him
can also defend himY The public defender must deal with the same court
system and often the same personnel daily. He cannot afford to alienate them.
Casper, in American Criminal Justice, observes:
[T]he court system is itself a social system. The public defender "lives" with
prosecutors and judges. He deals with them week in and week out, talking
with them about cases, bargaining, perhaps socializing. His relationship to
division to choose from the full range of systems a method of providing counsel
which is suited to its needs and consistent with these standards and should allow
local subdivisions to act jointly in establishing such a plan.
132 This is particularly acute in defining indigency and eligibility, as discussed in Part V,
Section B infra. See IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PRESCRIPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE at 8,
38-41; THE OTHER FACE OF JusTim at 41.
133 See, e.g., Dimock, The Public Defender: A Step Towards a Police State?, 42 A.B.A.J.
219, 221 (1956).
134 CASPER, supra note 97, at 103-07.
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any one client is transient; his relationship to prosecutors, judges and
other court personnel is "permanent." Whether he gets on well with them
or has an acrimonious relationship can significantly determine whether his
job is enjoyable or full of conflict and frustration. 3 5
Professionally and socially the defense counsel must function within the system.
However, there is great danger that his role as adversary will be sorely com-
promised and the instances are legion of defense counsel "trading off" cases or
favors or "copping out" clients rather than assiduously urging a client's case.
This is particularly true in a plea bargaining context, where much depends
upon personal and professional position or style, without the scrutiny of the
public courtroom. It is equally true in the open courtroom where the adversary
role is often compromised under the pressures of judges who are unsympathetic
to the pleadings and trials of vigorous advocacy.
Oftentimes the failure of advocacy may be attributed to individual counsel
who do not believe in or fail to assert their role. Yet the pressures tending toward
such compromise are formidable. A defender whose very employment, whose
assignment to a case, and whose trial resources and scheduling are all dictated
by a single judge or prosecutor is at a severe disadvantage in attempting to
challenge a system on behalf of a client. To assure at least the possibility of
vigorous advocacy, most proposals and the better public defender systems
establish the defender agency-be it assigned counsel or public defender-as a
semiautonomous entity."'
The Model Public Defender Act would establish an office of the Defender-
General as an executive-not judicial-agency of the state."7 He would be
appointed by the governor for a period of six years. The Defender-General
would be empowered to hire his own staff."' He would have full latitude in
representing defendants, even to the point of filing federal court proceedings
when appropriate." 9 A similar proposal appears in the National Advisory Com-
mission Courts Standard 13.8. Section 1.4 of the A.B.A. Standards on Defense
Function provides, with respect to autonomy:
One means for assuring . . . independence, regardless of the type of system
adopted, is to place the ultimate authority and responsibility for the oper-
ation of the plan in a board of trustees. Where an assigned counsel system
is selected, it should be governed by such a board. The board should have
the power to establish general policy for the operation of the plan, con-
sistent with these standards and in keeping with the standards of profes-
sional conduct. The board should be precluded from interfering in the
conduct of particular cases.
The program should establish standards whereby each attorney should then
determine, for example, eligibility and the need for supporting resources (such
135 Id. at 103.
136 See generally IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PRESCRnPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE at 13.
A full-time autonomous public defender would seem to be preferred by most judges, prosecu-





[Vol. 50:41] CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS FOR THE POOR
as investigation or expert witnesses), with review in the governing board, not
the trial court. In particular, eligibility should never be at issue in the court
trying an accused. Review by the board should not interfere with the handling
of a particular case, unless a client seeks to have the staff attorney replaced.
Otherwise, the board should allow an attorney to proceed to conclusion, although
it may then discharge him. In so doing, a full, if informal, hearing may be
appropriate, but it should not include review of the client's folder without his
consent.
The A.B.A. Commentary is consistent with these observations, although
there is little emphasis upon state-wide administration. However, the Com-
mentary does emphasize the importance of independent boards in assuring the
independence of staff attorneys. The Commentary wisely excludes prosecutors
and judges from the board but would also exclude all others except lawyers.
No reason is given. Experience in civil legal services establishes the value and
wisdom of placing members of the client population on the board to afford
bridges for communication and to assure the responsiveness of the agency.
Similar diversity has proven beneficial in other areas of social services, such as
health and welfare programs. No good reason appears for insulating a defender
board from the community it serves.
C. Selection of Attorneys
Selection of attorneys in assigned counsel systems or for public defender
offices is of crucial importance. Salary, caseload, administration-all of these
affect the quality of services rendered. None of these, however, is as important
as hiring responsible attorneys who are responsive to the needs of their clients.
This has been the single most critical factor in civil legal services to the poor.140
It is no less important for criminal defense.
1. Full-Time Public Defenders
Experience has established that part-time attorneys in public defender
offices are undesirable. Their private practices compete with their public clients,
who in consequence receive poorer services."' Yet it is equally true that the
limited salaries available to full-time staff may be insufficient to attract extremely
competent attorneys. For this reason, part-time staff positions-it has been
argued-are desirable, making it possible to attract attorneys of high quality."4
The real answer, of course, is to raise salaries and make a full-time staff possible.
The National Advisory Commission has recommended a selection method
for full-time public defenders. The chief public defender should be nominated
by a selection board and appointed by a governor or a jurisdiction's Judicial
140 See Finman, OEO Legal Services Programs and the Pursuit of Social Change, 1971
WIs. L. REv. 1001, 1074-75.
141 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADvIsORY CoMImiSSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Commentary to
Standard 13.7; ABA STANDARDS ON THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.2 (Approved Draft, 1968);
IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PREscRiPTIvE PocRAmI PACKAGE at 15.
142 See Jones, The Minnesota Plan, DEFENDER CONFERENCE REPORT 82, 86-87.
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Nominating Committee for a term of four years.14 The objective would be to
assure as much independence "as any private counsel who undertakes the
defense of a fee-paying criminally accused person" possesses.144 Discipline would
lie with the Judicial Nominating Commission, 45 to be applied in cases of
"permanent physical or mental disability seriously interfering with the perfor-
mance of his duties, willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to
perform public defender duties, habitual intemperance, or conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice."' 4
Most proposals concerning staff of defense systems are opposed to tenure
or civil service status for staff attorneys. This is the position of the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice, which argues that staff may rely
upon "professionalism" for protection from retaliation, while curiously main-
taining that a newly appointed public defender should remain free to assemble
a new staff "best suited to his needs."'' Civil service status is indispensable to
this goal, with possible exceptions for probationary staff and for the director.
Programs which have discriminated against hiring client populations in
the past should undertake programs of affirmative action to correct any existing
imbalance. People charged with crime are not randomly selected from society.
They usually reflect the minority groups of the jurisdiction: poor, black, brown,
red, yellow-rarely white and middle class. To the fullest extent possible, these
minorities should be represented in the staff and management of defender pro-
grams to assure effective communication with minority clients and faith by them
in that representation.
Compensation will be discussed later but some mention is relevant here.
The minimum level of compensation should be that paid by law enforcement
agencies for persons of similar competence and responsibility. In addition,
certain other factors argue for higher pay to full-time public defender staff:
their disfavored status in the courts and among the bar generally, the favored
status of prosecution career patterns, the present lack of qualified defense attor-
neys, and the attractive salary schedules of private law firms. The need for a
favorable compensation schedule is heightened if civil service status is denied.
2. Assigned Counsel and the "Indigent" Bar
Selection of assigned counsel involves competing values: the desire to
avoid favoritism by random selection and the need for selectivity based on
143 Courts Standard 13.8. The majority of public defenders are now hired by judges or
county boards. THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTiCE at 19.
144 Courts Standard 13.8.
145 See Courts Standard 7.4.
146 Courts Standard 13.8.
147 Courts Standard 13.10. Such an approach hardly is calculated to encourage career
service, a value espoused by the ABA Standards:
A defender plan should be designed to create a career service. Selection of the
chief defender and staff should be made on the basis of merit and should be free
from political, racial, religious, ethnic and other considerations extraneous to profes-
sional competence. The tenure of the defender and his staff should be protected
similarly. The defender and staff should be compensated at a rate commensurate
with their experience and skill, sufficient to attract career personnel, and comparable
to that provided for their counterparts in prosecutorial offices. § 3.1.
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experience. A further consideration is the need to provide broad involvement
of the bar in reform of the criminal process. In assigned counsel systems, training
and supervision may allow a broad base of selection encompassing both criminal
specialists and less experienced attorneys. In public defender systems, a broad
base can be developed by using a panel of private attorneys to supplement the
full-time staff and by involving private attorneys in the governing body of the
program.
Some fairly broad-based, systematic distribution of assignments is desirable
to avoid favoritism. One study in Kentucky indicates the range of problems in
appointment systems. Some judges appointed on a strict rotation system; others
picked from attorneys in the courtroom." 8 Some attorneys, in consequence,
might be appointed to represent an accused once a year. Others were appointed
as frequently as twenty times per year.'49 Similar diversity and disparities ap-
peared from county to county in appointment of counsel in Oregon5 0 and
Maine.' 5 ' In Chicago, another study'5 2 indicated that two attorneys received
forty-seven of one hundred forty-six fees paid for appointment cases. A study in
Milwaukee 53 indicated that only 11 percent of the bar participated in court
appointments and of these a handful were assigned more than one third of all
the cases. One attorney received $14,000 for fifty-eight cases; another received
$25 for one case. Some were appointed exclusively and extensively by a single
judge. Such concentration on a few attorneys may lead to cronyism, on the one
hand, or overburdening of the more experienced members of the bar, on the
other.'54 Neither is desirable.
Broad selection from the bar is a critical factor in rendering effective legal
services. The reasons are not clear, but in one study of two counties using as-
signed counsel systems, significantly better service was rendered in the county
which appointed systematically from the entire bar.'55 The best way to assure
results comparable to those obtained by private counsel may well be to involve
private counsel in public defense.
Most studies of effectiveness conclude that private counsel plead clients
guilty less often than both assigned counsel and public defenders. Indigents also
go to jail more often and for longer periods of time. Silverstein suggests this
may be in part at least a consequence of poverty, not of the quality of repre-
sentation. 5 It may as well be a product of the status and independence enjoyed
by private counsel and extended to their clients. If so, a broad-based system of
148 Boid, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in Kentucky, 53 Ky. L.J.
508, 511-14 (1965).
149 Id.
150 Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44 OR. L. REv. 255, 266
(1965).
151 Anderson, supra note 65, at 7-8. As to the District of Columbia, see United States v.
Chatman, 42 U.S.L.W. 2593 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 7, 1974).
152 Oaks & Lehman, supra note 46, at 698.
153 Summers, Defending the Poor: The Assigned Counsel System in Milwaukee County,
1969 Wis. L. REv. 525, 528-29.
154 Note, Implementing the Right to Counsel in New Jersey-A Proposed Defender System,
20 RUTGFRS L. Rzv. 789 (1966).
155 Kittel, Defense of the Poor: A Study in Public Parsimony and Private Poverty, 45 IND.
L.J. 90 (1970).
156 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 53-55.
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assigning cases would tap that reservoir of benefits for the poor, rather than
limiting them to defendants who retain private counsel.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement has observed that the
criminal bar is generally not well regarded by the remainder of the bar.'57
Criminal practice is not widely sought, whether because of the clients, the courts,
or the nature of the practice. By experience, an attorney in criminal practice
must expect to lose more cases than he will win.158 He must do so at a depressed
level of income in a depressing court setting. The result, the President's Com-
mission concluded, is that "in many of our cities there is a distinct criminal bar
of low legal and dubious ethical ability."'
59
A study 6 . in Oregon of the "indigent bar" revealed some significant insights
into the quality and status of lawyers serving the poor. Attorneys who were
appointed were rarely privately retained, suggesting that they were viewed with
disfavor on the open market. Relatively few represented the majority of indi-
gents. In one district court, four attorneys represented some 50 per cent of
indigents.' 6' Four lawyers of wide experience were asked to rate the "indigent
bar" and attorneys from the general bar. The former were uniformly viewed
as inferior. 2 When the appointment panel was broadened to include the entire
bar, a dramatic improvement in services could be seen in dismissals, pleas, trials
and sentences. 6
A broader-based system of selection will inevitably draw upon less experi-
enced, younger attorneys. This is in contrast to public defender staff attorneys,
who are generally more experienced.' In assigned counsel systems, there s a
danger that the younger attorneys may thus acquire experience at the expense
of the poor. 65 Involving the younger attorneys may nevertheless be worthwhile
if they are given support and supervision in order to capitalize upon their fresh-
ness and dedication. The simple fact is that experience is not necessarily the
critical factor in producing results.' 66
Several studies have indicated that it is also possible to involve older mem-
bers of the bar in court appointment systems. 7 Where this has been done,
results have improved substantially. The experience and prestige of older
members of the bar can be of value to individual clients. More importantly,
change in the criminal justice system can be effected best if the most respected
members of the bar are motivated to seek it. This motivation can come from
direct involvement in representing clients.
157 TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 57-58.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 57. See also United States v. Chatman, 42 U.S.L.W. 2593 (D.C. Super. Ct.
May 7, 1974).
160 Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44 ORE. L. REV. 255 (1965).
161 Id. at 273.
162 Id. at 280-82.
163 Id. at 286.
164 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 16; Lewin, A Tale of Two Districts, 14 WAYNE L.
Rv. 528, 541 (1968); THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 54-59.
165 Siegal, Gideon and Beyond: Achieving an Adequate Defense for the Indigent, 59 J.
CRIM. L. 73 (1968).
166 See State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 406, 217 A.2d 441, 444 (1966).
167 Note, Adequate Representation for Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases: Appoint-
ment of Counsel Under the Criminal justice Act of 1964, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 758 (1966).
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Consequently, a broad-based system can and should involve both the old
and the young. In so doing, it must to some extent match experience with the
difficulty of a particular case. It has been suggested that selection on the basis
of experience is not possible in court appointment systems. 68 In fact, quite the
opposite is true. Judges do appoint selectively, sometimes on the basis of merit
or experience " and sometimes on the basis of favoritism. In the latter case, it
is a fair criticism of appointment systems that they are too selective. The selec-
tivity urged here would have the appointment administrator, preferably not a
judge," assign cases in a systematic sequence with limited discretion to match
experience with the difficulty of the case. To do this, all that is needed is a
better set of criteria.Y
To a large extent, the initiatives for involving the general bar in the crimi-
nal process must come from the courts. They can assure effective counsel and
broad-based involvement by their rule-making. If, contrary to the A.B.A. Stan-
dards, they continue to appoint only counsel physically present in court, they
assure-as the author can attest from his own experience-inept representation.
Anything less than a broad-gauge, neutral system of selection will perpetuate
the disreputable, ineffective, "indigent" bar."2
The improved criteria urged here are consistent with involving the general
bar, despite its inexperience. "Inexperience" is a misleading term: the specialties
of corporate, real estate, tax and securities practices do not disqualify an attorney
for the criminal courtroom. They demand from him the same imagination,
analysis, interviewing, counsel, persuasion and advocacy required in the criminal
process. It is important also that young-albeit inexperienced-attorneys be
eligible for assignment. If further specific education or assistance is needed,
it can be built into the system and provided by full-time staff. 4
The New Haven program conducted an extended experiment involving a
168 See DEFENDER CONFERENCE REPORT at 97.
169 See, e.g., Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44 ORE. L. REv. 255,
266-70 (1965).
170 See ABA STANDARDS ON TnE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 2.2 (Approved Draft, 1968)
which provides for random selection except "where the nature of the charges or other circum-
stances required." An attorney may then be chosen because of his "special qualifications."
IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PREsCRIPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE at 43-47.
171 Oaks, The Criminal Justice in the Federal District Courts-A Summary and Post-
script, 7 Am. CaMi. L.Q. 210, 214-15 (1969). Section 2.1 of the ABA Standards concerning
Defense Services provides:
An assigned counsel plan should provide for a systematic and publicized method
of distributing assignments. Except where there is need for an immediate assign-
ment for temporary representation, assignments should not be made to lawyers
merely because they happen to be present in court at the time the assignment is
made. A lawyer should never be assigned for reasons personal to the person making
assignments. If the volume of assignments is substantial, the plan should be admin-
istered by a competent staff able to advise and assist assigned counsel.
172 See Part IV, Section (0, subsection 5 infra.
173 Contra, SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 17-19.
174 Section 2.3 of the ABA STANDARDS ON DEFENSE SERVICES provides:
As nearly as possible assignments should be made in an orderly way to avoid
the appearance of patronage and to ensure fair distribution of assignments among
all whose names appear on the roster of eligible lawyers. Ordinarily assignments
should be made in the sequence that the names appear on the roster of eligible
lawyers. Where the nature of the charges or other circumstances require, a lawyer
may be selected because of his special qualifications to serve in the case, without
regard to the established sequence.
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panel of private attorneys compensated for serving clients who chose them from
a list in preference to full-time defenders. The author administered this system
for some six months. The private attorneys achieved results which were often
as good as or better than those of full-time defenders. While the cost per case
was somewhat higher, the panel system amply demonstrated the importance of
two values previously mentioned: involvement of the private bar and choice
by the client. The panel was the equivalent of an assigned counsel system and
the freedom of choice by the client operated to assure in large measure that
experienced, effective counsel were most frequently chosen with a high degree
of client satisfaction. Where experience was lacking, the panel administrator
was available for consultation.
What is being urged here is adoption of better criteria in order to involve
the entire bar in the criminal process as a powerful force for reform. Chief
Judge Bazelon has observed, in considering whether time is "reasonably ex-
pended" for compensation under the Criminal Justice Act, that:
Involving attorneys who would not ordinarily appear in a criminal case
in the day-to-day administration of criminal justice in the District of
Columbia may well have significant advantages, not only to the particular
defendant, but to the criminal justice system itself. Frequently, those whose
daily task it is to administer criminal justice become accustomed to things
as they are and overlook shortcomings which are obvious to an outsider.
A fresh view not infrequently brings into focus defects which others have
not seen. If this be deemed important, and I am inclined to think that it
is, then it may be entirely consistent with the purpose of the statute to deem
the time it takes such a lawyer to become familiar with basic principles to
be "reasonably expended." On the other hand, appointment, on a rotation
basis, of attorneys not familiar with the criminal justice system may result
in their client's bearing the cost of their inexperience. While the inexpe-
rienced lawyer is not to be condemned for an error bred of this lack of
familiarity with criminal law or procedure, it must be remembered that the
client is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. 75
3. Preference of the Defendant
Selection of counsel is a matter of considerable consequence. It takes dif-
ferent forms in assigned counsel and public defender systems, but each shares
the common question of whether the accused should have any voice in selection.
This is administratively feasible and is done with Judicare." 6 It has also been
done with a court appointment system in Illinois. 7 ' Presumably, it could be
done as well and more easily with a public defender system, yet it is usually not
done."" In fact, one study in Oregon which polled judges found two-thirds
opposed to the accused having any voice in selecting his public counsel.'79 A
175 United States v. Thompson, 361 F. Supp. 879, 884 n.12 (D.D.C. 1973).
176 See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs at 59.
177 Oaks & Lehman, supra note 46, at 694-96.
178 See United States v. Thompson, 361 F. Supp. 879, 887-89 (D.D.C. 1973).
179 Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44 ORE. L. REv. 255, 267(1965).
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substantial minority, however, felt that participation would enhance trust in
the attorney-client relationship.
Casper's study 80 indicates that freedom to choose counsel is an important
factor in an accused's feelings concerning counsel and the criminal justice sys-
tem. The prisoners interviewed uniformly preferred retained counsel. They
would also prefer "private" defenders (that is, those on the staff of an auton-
omous program like New Haven's) to public defenders. The reason, to the
extent it could be established, appeared to be that freedom of choice is simply
not available in the Connecticut public defender system. In consequence,
rightly or wrongly, many defendants are dissatisfied with the representation
they receive.
Arguably, this imposes a needless burden on the administration of defense
systems. However, the burden is not needless; freedom of choice may enhance
the effectiveness of a system. The burden need not be great; the client's choice
should be honored only to the extent it does not overburden any particular
attorney, whether assigned or full time.
The model used by civil legal services for the poor throughout the country
permits free choice by indigents of the attorney who will represent them. The
traditional model for delivery of privately retained legal services offers a similar
choice. Indeed, the Bar emphasizes this as a major virtue of its Judicare service
to the public.' 8 ' There is no reason to think there is less value in allowing indi-
gent criminal defendants a similar choice.
Most cases opposing freedom of choice involve belated, frivolous complaints
concerning appointed counsel. When these arise, as they often do, on the eve
of trial, refusal to substitute new counsel is administratively reasonable.'8 2 At
the same time, the refusal is clearly undesirable if it leads to pro se representation
with its inevitably inept and disruptive defenses.'8 3 Substituting counsel when
administratively feasible is preferable to pro se representation and may even be
a logical corollary of the constitutional right' to undertake a pro se defense.
An adequately staffed, autonomous defense program should be well able
to allow defendants broad latitude in their choice of counsel. The New Haven
program has done so with both its full-time and panel attorneys, incurring little
administrative difficulty. Such an approach has meant that courts need not
face the "eve of trial" complaints from defendants who are dissatisfied with
counsel forced upon them. Freedom of choice thus minimizes administrative
problems, rather than exacerbating them.
As with earlier matters, this is a subject for court rule-making. Courts
can provide that, within broad ranges, defendants shall have a choice as to
public counsel. Such rules are well within judicial competence concerning the
sixth amendment's provision of counsel or the court's superintendence over
admission of counsel. The failure of the courts to act in the past has doubt-
180 CASPER, supra note 97.
181 See Brakel, The Case for Judicare, 59 A.B.A.J. 1407, 1409 (1973).
182 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1973); Good v. United
States, 378 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1967).
183 See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1123-24 (D.C. 'Cir. 1972).
184 See cases at notes 82-83 supra; Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279 (1942).
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less been a source of the very complaints which may make them reluctant to
adopt such rules.
4. Continuity of Representation
Assigned counsel systems, and to a lesser degree public defender offices,
can assure that a single attorney will represent a client at all stages of the pro-
cess, on a one-to-one basis and without having to divide a case into stages. 5
This assures uniformity in dealing with the prosecutor's office in a single matter.
It heightens the professional status and skills of staff."" And it reduces the
'probability that defenses and cases will be lost as they are passed from one
staff attorney to another."7 Section 5.2 of the A.B.A. Standards on Defense
Service therefore provides that counsel initially appointed should continue to
represent the defendant through all stages of the proceedings.
A division of function should not be attempted at the trial level. A number
of defender offices limit particular attorneys to appearances in designated
courts. A client who goes from one court to another may thus be served by
several attorneys, as in many felony prosecutions which may be bound over
from a lower to a higher court. The same may be true of de novo review of
misdemeanor trials. The result is a reduction in client confidence and an in-
crease in attorney inefficiency. Both should be avoided.
While counsel should ordinarily remain with the client throughout the
process, full-time defender agencies may have counsel who specialize in post-
conviction procedures. Unless the client objects, it may be appropriate and
indeed wise to afford a client the fresh perspective and valuable expertise of
new counsel. If the client objects, his trial counsel should remain with the
case.
There is relatively little case law concerning an accused's right to continuity
of counsel.' In Wallace v. Kern, discussed earlier in this article, the district
court severely criticized the Legal Aid Society practice of having different
attorneys handle different phases of a case from interview to plea through trial
and disposition. The court relied upon three separate studies criticizing this
practice and commented:
An acceptable one-to-one relationship between client and attorney has
yet to be developed. At present attorneys are assigned to court parts rather
than to individual cases. Although this is a necessary budget-saving device,
it hampers the intimate attorney-client relationship available to those who
can retain private counsel. Moreover attorneys are unfamiliar with a case
185 Steward, Coordinated Assigned Counsel Systems in Large Jurisdictions, DEFENDER
CONFERENCE REPORT 48, 52.
186 Comment, Client Service in a Defender Organization: The Philadelphia Experience,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 448 (1969):
The advantages of the man to man system are considerable. In addition to the
obvious benefit to the client, such a system is of considerable psychological benefit
to the attorneys involved: their image of themselves as professional men with indi-
vidual clients is naturally improved. Id. at 451.
187 [Footnote omitted.]
188 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); United States v. Smallwood, 473 F.2d
98 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Estes, 485 F.2d 1078, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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until it is assigned to them in court. There is no time to order investigations
or to fully prepare case arguments... Clients are reinterviewed as they
pass from court part to part, from one attorney to another. The rapport
between attorney and client suffers in this process, impinging adversely on
plea-bargaining, trial strategy and sentencing decisions.18 9
A client may request that counsel be replaced. Such a request should be
discussed with the client and, if persisted in, granted. The reasons may not be
clear, since defendants by education or situation are often inarticulate. Even if
clear, the reasons may appear merely personal or otherwise unpersuasive to
counsel or court. Nevertheless, the request should be granted in order to assure
an appearance and sense of justice, unless replacing counsel unduly impedes
court processes or serving other clients.
A related problem is that of counsel requesting leave to withdraw. This is
obviously inconsistent with the need for continuity of representation. The A.B.A.
Standards on Defense Services, section 5.3 state:
Once appointed, counsel should not request leave to withdraw unless
compelled to do so because of serious illness or other incapacity to render
competent representation in the case, or unless contemporaneous or an-
nounced future conduct of the accused is such as to seriously compromise
the lawyer's professional integrity.
The importance of continuous representation cannot be overemphasized.
In the author's experience, it is crucial to effective representation. As such, it
bears special attention by the courts. Certainly, their general authority over
cases and counsel permit rule-making requiring continuity. Such rules should
be adopted.
D. Role of the Constituency
Public criminal defense services for those unable to obtain private counsel
serve an identifiable segment of society. By definition, such people are econom-
ically deprived. By common experience, the poor in our society are identifiable
by other forms of deprivation involving education, employment, housing, and
race. Such people frequently depend upon the state while being largely alienated
from the greater society. This is the constituency, the client population, of legal
services for the poor.
If this article were devoted to describing the needs of the poor, perhaps the
preceding paragraph would warrant extensive amplification and supporting
documentation. However, the needs of indigents have been widely discussed
elsewhere, leading to the broad expansion of the right to counsel noted earlier
in this article. What remains is to implement that right to meet the needs of the
client constituency. To accomplish this, the concept and the administration of
defense services must be appropriately tailored.
The client population must participate in the defense program. They should
189 Wallace v. Kern, supra note 22, Memorandum Opinion at 30.
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be hired as staff attorneys, investigators, secretaries, translators, receptionists, or
aides. This facilitates providing competent counsel and disseminating knowledge
about the availability of legal services. Of course, hiring the poor also uplifts
the economic well-being of those hired. All of these reasons argue for special
efforts to prefer the target or client population in staffing a defense program.
Further, members of the program's constituency should be in policy-making
positions and should have training and coordinating responsibilities. Programs
serving the poor often reflect or are controlled by middle-class values. This im-
pairs the effectiveness of the services and does violence to basic concepts of
human dignity and diversity. A policy-making role not only serves as a cor-
rective to class bias but also provides means of communication between the
program and the community.
This has certainly been the experience of civil legal services programs. With
respect to the client constituency, the comment to the N.L.A.D.A. Standards
concerning civil legal services programs provides:
The community served should be consulted before deciding the order
of prior ties as it affects caseload. Although this is an extremely difficult
task, efforts can be made to encourage their expression in many ways, i.e.,
neighborhood meetings, discussion with recognized leaders or representatives,
polls, even door-to-door surveys. Results realized may not be an exact re-
flection of a totally reasoned decision by the community; however, such
techniques can significantly affect and inform the decision that the organ-
ization finally makes on caseload and other questions.190
The role of the client constituency in defender programs was noted in passing
by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement in dealing with positions
which might be filled by laymen. The Commission said: "Residents of the poor
neighborhoods who are knowledgeable about the backgrounds and social prob-
lems of the people involved in many cases are a promising source of manpower
for these jobs."''
Proximity to the client constituency is important. A majority of criminal
defendants live in urban areas, a majority of them are poor and a majority of
them are crowded into high-density squalor. Locating public defense offices in
these neighborhoods is an effective way to serve them. It can thus add an ele-
ment of stability and hope, providing palpable evidence that abstractions con-
cerning justice have reality.
Again, this has been the experience with civil legal services programs. The
A.B.A. Standards on Defense Services, section 3.3, provide a curiously bureau-
cratic contrast in stating that "Every defender office should be located in a place
convenient to the courts and be furnished in a manner appropriate to the dignity
of the legal profession." In contrast is the N.A.C. Courts Standard 13.13(2),
which provides that the public defender should seek office locations to avoid
being "excessively identified" with courts and police, preferably "within the
neighborhoods from which his clients predominantly come." There should of
190 Comment to Standard 6.
191 TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 59.
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course be a central office which will in most communities be near the courts.
Proximity to the courts is of value only to the extent that it aids rendering de-
fense services. The defender agency is not a court agency. Indeed, studies in-
dicate that public acceptance of-and therefore the effectiveness of-a defender
program depends in part upon its ability to distinguish itself from the taint of
police-welfare-courts associations which often attaches to all public agenciesY"
To the extent that image and appearance are psychological aids to counsel-
ing, defender offices should seek not only a "professional" appearance but also
one which identifies the office and service with the client community. At a
minimum, privacy, dignity, and minimal comforts are needed. Beyond that,
decor should be calculated to encourage clients-particularly those of an iden-
tifiable ethnic group-to identify with the attorneys. Above all, the physical sur-
roundings of the defender office should neither convey an assocation of welfare
or police surroundings nor reflect dilapidation, decay, despair, or disinterest.
Much of this commentary may appear comprised of vague and unimportant
bromides. However, anyone who has ever observed a typical public defender
office will appreciate the importance of these concerns. Urban public defender
offices are frequently of a piece with the jails and courts: old, dirty, cramped,
and offensive to both human dignity and a due sense of justice. Neither counsel
nor clients, as the court in Wallace v. Kern observed, can rise very far above the
place left them in the scheme of justice.
V. Procedures of Defense Systems
A. Early Contact with the Client
One major criticism of assigned counsel systems is that they do not make
possible early contact between client and attorney.19 Administrative delay,
particularly appointment by a judge, may lead to delays of days or weeks.'"
The same may be true in public defender systems.'95 The point is that delay is
undesirable in any system and inherent in none. An assigned counsel system can
be devised in which client contact and eligibility can be established at or shortly
after arrest, with subsequent review by the court.
As the President's Commission noted, it is extremely important that counsel
be afforded early in the criminal process.Y8 This early availability of counsel may
help in investigation and preparation. The Commission also emphasized other
factors, such as helping with bail and employment, as well as the possibility of
diverting the matter at an early stage from the criminal process. The National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice has identified"9 7 four functions counsel
192 See CASPER, supra note 97.
193 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 29-32.
194 See, e.g., Note, Implementing the Right to Counsel in New Jersey - A Proposed
Defender System, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 789, 808-12 (1966) (noting an average delay of 35
days between arrest and initial client contact).
195 See, e.g., Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel and Public Defender Sys-
tems, 49 N.C. L. REv. 705, 712 (1971).
196 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 53-54.
197 Standard 13.1.
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may perform by early contact with an accused. First, counsel may preclude
waiver-effective or otherwise--of constitutional rights. Second, counsel can
begin prompt investigation. Third, plea bargaining is often affected and even
initiated during the booking process. Finally, early entry into the case by counsel
facilitates better representation in the preliminary stages of the process, such as
arraignment, the setting of bail, and the conduct of preliminary motions or hear-
ings.
When necessary, the decision as to eligibility should be deferred in favor of
providing prompt representation. The vice-representation of ineligible defen-
dants-can be cured later, leaving subsequent private representation unimpaired.
The benefit of protecting the accused's rights will be assured. Indeed, early
presence of counsel may expedite police processing since the accused is thereby
made available for interrogation or lineup purposes.
Early notice and prompt attention are particularly appropriate with many
misdemeanor prosecutions. Many cases involving credit or marital matters, for
example, can be diverted from the criminal courts if approached promptly.
Since bail may be arranged more easily in misdemeanor cases, efforts to secure
it should be prompt. Finally, waiver is a particularly acute problem in mis-
demeanor matters and counsel should make initial contact with the accused as
early as possible. As Justice Douglas observed in Argersinger, the volume of mis-
demeanor cases, "far greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create an
obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result."'9 g The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement observed that:
An inevitable consequence of volume that large is the almost total pre-
occupation in such a court with the movement of cases. The calendar is
long, speed often is substituted for care, and casually arranged out-of-court
compromise too often is substituted for adjudication. Inadequate attention
tends to be given to the individual defendant, whether in protecting his
rights, sifting the facts at trial, deciding the social risk he presents, or
determining how to deal with him after conviction. The frequent result is
futility and failure.199
The Model Public Defender Act therefore provides that the custodian of a
person shall advise him of his right to free counsel and notify the public defender
of the person's presence."' ° The Commentary says unequivocally that representa-
tion prior to court appearance need not turn upon eligibility or await such a
determination. Any determination of need is to be deferred until a later court
appearance,2 ' but counsel is to be afforded in the interim to protect the rights of
the accused. An accused shall have counsel "beginning with the earliest time
when a person providing his own counsel would be entitled."'"
198 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
199 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JuSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967).
200 Section 3(a)(2).
201 Section 4(a).
202 Section 2(b) (1). One of the most frequent causes of complaints concerning ineffec-
tiveness of counsel has been late appointment. For varying treatments compare Moore v.
United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1970); Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875, 877 (4th
Cir. 1973); Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251 (1st Cir. 1971); Frates v. Bohlinger, 472
F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1973); Walker v. Wainwright, 350 F. Supp. 916 (M.D. FIa. 1972).
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In a similar vein, the New Jersey Public Defender Act provides:
[I]f it [the court] shall subsequently determine that the defendant is ineligible
it shall so inform the defendant, and the defendant shall thereupon be
obliged to engage his own counsel and to reimburse the office for the cost
of the services rendered to that time.203
Early notice may be defeated by administrative delays. Court rules should
require arresting officials to notify the defender agency directly when an accused
is taken into custody. This should be done in every case, even where the ac-
cused will probably not be financially eligible for public defense but does not
have an attorney whom he can call immediately. The defender staff may then
provide initial representation and make its own determination of eligibility, sub-
ject to later review by the court.
B. Eligibility
1. Who Decides
Determination of eligibility in different jurisdictions may in some instances
require participation or approval by the court, prosecutor, or public defender.20'
This may be time-consuming due to court calendars, procedures or the nature of
the case. If so, it is important that the accused be afforded counsel during the
delay."' The importance of early contact with the client was discussed in the
preceding section. If such contact is to be effected, eligibility determinations
cannot await formal court action.0 Either counsel must be afforded before
eligibility is determined by a judge or eligibility must be determined by someone
other than a judge. The latter is preferable.
Use of public defenders to determine eligibility has the virtues of speed and
expertise. It is the approach taken by civil legal services programs which do
not require affidavits or even full financial statements for routine determinations
of eligibility.0 ' By statute in California, either the public defender or the court
may determine financial eligibility and a finding of eligibility by the public
defender is not subject to review." A finding of ineligibility, of course, is and
should be reviewable.
In the federal courts, procedures vary somewhat. Generally it appears that
counsel is appointed at arraignment by the United States Commissioner, with
only minimal financial screening. " Speed is thereby favored over thoroughness,
with the result that "as a practical matter, counsel is always appointed under
the act for an accused not represented by retained counsel." 210 This procedure
203 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 158A-14 (1971).
204 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 105-06.
205 Sections 3(a) and 4(a).
206 See IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PRESCRPTrvE PROGRAM PACKAGE at 54-55.
207 See 2 CCH Pov. L. RPTR. 11 9300.141, 9300.28 '(1973).
208 Ingram v. Justice Court, Lake Valley, 69 Cal. 2d 832, 447 P.2d 650 (1968).
209 Timbers et al., judicial Perspectives on the Operation of the Criminal Justice Act of
1964, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 55, 57 (1967).
210 Id. at 56-57.
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has been criticized,2" but is sensible in the light of the large percentage of
indigent defendants in the criminal courts.
The A.B.A. Standards provide that eligibility should be determined by a
judge or court official, but that the preliminary determination should be made as
early as possible,212 perhaps as part of the booking process. Other proposals
provide for notification and provision of counsel upon "commencement of deten-
tion," with the public defender determining eligibility at that time.12 Decisions
could later be reviewed by the court. The notification to the public counsel could
come routinely as part of the booking process or, as the National Advisory Com-
mission has suggested, 1 by direct contact from the accused or a friend.
The preferable mode of determining eligibility would be by "an officer of
the court" and no sound reason exists to exclude the public defender from this
category. Eligibility for most services, such as welfare and education, is
determined by the administrators of the service. To involve any other court
officer in the eligibility determination implies a lack of confidence in the public
defender; no similar review is made of office decisions by prosecutors. It reflects
as well a "welfare" or "dole" mentality concerning the right to public counsel.
Indeed, good reason exists to exclude virtually all other court functionaries
including the judge. All of these have a function other than defense, whether it
be clerking, supervising probation or serving as a judge. Determining eligibility
may involve decisions which would influence those other responsibilities. That
influence is a risk not assumed by affluent defendants; it is inequitable to impose
it on the poor. Further, the information concerning eligibility may be routinely
gathered by the public defender while preparing the defense; it is simply more
efficient for him to determine eligibility.
The dangers when a judge participates in the eligibility decision were
underscored by Bing and Rosenfeld's study of the Boston courts. 15 The
standards and procedures varied widely with individual judges. In addition,
some traded lenient sentences for waiver of counsel. Statistics indicated that
those without counsel received lighter sentences. The emphasis earlier in this
article on independence is critical to the determination of eligibility.
In misdemeanor cases, eligibility under Argersinger may necessitate some
prediction as to the likelihood of imprisonment.2"' This should not be under-
taken by the trial judge, since doing so might prejudice him or indicate to a later
judge that the appointment of counsel reflects a judgment that imprisonment is
appropriate. 1 ' If anyone else undertakes such a prediction there may be result-
ing error, indicating that such a criterion should not be employed.21 If such a
211 See, e.g., Connally, Problems in the Determination of Indigency for the Assignment of
Counsel, 1 GA. B.J. 11, 14 (1964).
212 ABA MINIIUM STANDARDS: DEFENSE SERVICES § 6.3 (Approved Draft, 1968).
213 §§ 7(b) and 8(c) of proposed bill in Appendix to Anderson, supra note 65. See aho
Part V, Section A supra.
214 Courts Standard 13.1-13.3.
215 Bing and Rosenfeld, supra note 44.
216 See Wood v. Superintendent Caroline Correctional Unit, 355 F. Supp. 338, 343-44
(E.D. Va. 1973).
217 See THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 63-64.
218 As to the general difficulty posed by considering imprisonment as a criterion for ap-
pointing counsel, see IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PRESCRIPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE at 8.
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prediction is necessary, the public defender is in the best position to make an
informed judgment as to the likelihood of imprisonment. He alone knows the
issues and facts of the defense and can fully evaluate the claims of the prosecu-
tion. Indeed, he must do so routinely as a basis for advising his client.
2. Financial Standards
There is no clear rule as to financial eligibility; a range of factors is usually
considered. A typical formulation appears in the Model Public Defender Act:
In determining whether a person is a needy person and the extent of his
ability to pay, the court may consider such factors as income, property
owned, outstanding obligations and the number and ages of his dependents.
Release on bail does not necessarily disqualify him from being a needy
person.2
1 9
Usually, the test is framed as being one of "indigency." That term has been
soundly criticized by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement:
[T]ests based on the concept of indigency fail to recognize that defendants of
limited means may have some money but not enough to pay for an adequate
defense. They also afford no protection for a defendant who may have
sufficient money to retain a lawyer at the outset of the proceeding but
whose funds are exhausted before the end of a long trial. The need for
socially provided services arises whenever any aspect of adequate representa-
tion is financially out of reach of a defendant, even though he is able to
bear some expenses of his defense.2 0
Obviously, this is a relative concept, depending upon the court, community,
and accused's view of the value of representation, the availability of an in-
dividual's limited resources and-indeed-the meaning of "poverty." This was
succinctly noted by Oaks and Lehman when they observed that "The more
advantages society extends to the indigent, the more apparent is the comparative
disadvantage of being of modest means." '221 If indigence is the inability to obtain
adequate representation, the question of what is "adequate" is also inevitably
raised and Oaks and Lehman comment that "perhaps this is a question best
not asked." '222 With respect to Griffin's dictum, noted earlier, concerning justice
not turning upon wealth, Oaks and Lehman comment: "The next logical step,
unless we are to concede that we will settle for less than 'equal justice,' is to
deny all criminal defendants the right to use any private resources in their own
defense.) 223
Implicit in any definition of financial eligibility is a sliding scale of economic
hardship. This might be better acknowledged as a system allowing partial
eligibility rather than an absolute "indigency" standard so that a person who can
219 Section 4(b).
220 TAsK FORcE REPORT: THE COURTS at 61.
221 Oaks & Lehman, supra note 46, at 716.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 717.
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pay part of the cost of representation is not totally denied counsel. Such a
structure would "safeguard against the danger that a defendant with some but
limited means will be held ineligible for the benefits of the Act and thus be
driven into the arms of an inexperienced or inept lawyer.. .""' The defendant
should be provided counsel and be required to pay into the system whatever he
can afford.2 This is the conclusion of the N.A.C. and the A.B.A. Standards
on Defense Services.2 26
Rather than a partial eligibility standard, most courts use instead the
indigency standard of the Supreme Court in Adkins v. E. I. DuPont Co.,.27 an
in forma pauperis civil action. The statute involved permits waiver of costs for a
person who is "unable to pay such costs" and by amendment in 1910 was made
applicable to both civil and criminal cases.2 s In Adkins, the Supreme Court
held that destitution was not necessary to qualify as "indigent." The plaintiff
was allowed to proceed, although her attorney might have had resources to pay
costs and although she had a home valued at $3,450, the rent from which sup-
ported her:
We cannot agree with the courts below that one must be absolutely
destitute to enjoy the benefit of the statute. We think an affidavit is suf-
ficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty "pay or give
security for costs . .. and still be able to provid&' himself and dependents
"with the necessities of life."12
29
Earlier cases had taken an antagonistic, absolutist approach to eligibility for
counsel. In using the term "indigency," they had implied a requirement of
destitution.230 This was rejected by the Supreme Court in Adkins and by the
Allen Report. 3' The Criminal Justice Act, a product of the Allen Report,
sedulously and studiously avoided using the term indigency because of its abso-
lutist connotations. 32 Instead, the test adopted was simple inability in a specific
case to retain counsel, a test adopted as well by the National Advisory Com-
mission, 33 the American Bar Association,234 the National Legal Aid and De-
fender Association,235 and the Office of Economic Opportunity23 6
224 Oaks, The Criminal Justice Act in the Federal District Courts - A Summary and
Postscript, 7 Am. GRIM. L.Q. 210, 213 (1969).
225 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 158A-16 (1971).
226 § 6.2 (Approved Draft, 1968); Courts Standard § 13.2.
227 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
228 Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1270, 1273-74
(1966).
229 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).
230 See Solomon, This New Fetish for Indigency, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 248, 255-56 (1966).
231 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 8 (1963): "Indigence must be conceived as
a relative concept. An impoverished accused is not necessarily one totally devoid of means."
232 See Note, Judicial Problems in Administering Court-Appointment of Counsel for
Indigents, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 120, 122 (1971); Note, supra note 167, at 770; Carter
and Hauser, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 36 F.R.D. 67 (1964).
233 Courts Standard § 13.2.
234 ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS: DEFENSE SERVICES § 6.1(a) (Approved Draft, 1968).
235 N.L.A.D.A., New Standards, 24 LEG. Am BRIEFCASE 61 (1965), emphasizing at page
66 the need to avoid creating by too stringent a standard a class of unrepresented defendants;
N.L.A.D.A. HANDBOOK FOR STANDARDS #5 (1970) (financial eligibility for civil legal services
programs).
236 See OEO Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 2 OCH Pov. L. RPT . 8700.35
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Such tests, as with the Model Public Defender Act, typically emphasize
income, assets, and probable expense of retaining private counsel. This emphasis
on the specific case is important since the cost of representation may vary greatly
depending upon, for example, whether a misdemeanor, an unpopular cause, or
law reform potential is involved. The cost of private counsel is thus a substantial
source of uncertainty in determining whether to appoint public counsel, as
indicated by the following attempt at a standard for compensating appointed
counsel:
In determining the amount of the fee in a criminal case it is proper to con-
sider the time and effort required, the responsibility assumed by counsel,
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill requisite to
proper representation, the likelihood that other employment will be pre-
cluded, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the
gravity of the charge, the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer
and the capacity of the client to pay the fee.27
The emphasis on inability to retain private counsel only serves to increase
the vagueness of the indigency standard. The nature of the test leaves much
room for discretion and variance, particularly at the less visible levels of the
criminal process. As noted earlier, Bing and Rosenfeld found substantial varia-
tion in the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases. 238 Some judges with-
draw counsel as punishment; others trade a lenient sentence for waiver9'" and
those without counsel may receive lighter sentences.24 In some courts, bail may
be revoked when public counsel is provided. 4' This variety in factors and value
judgments is particularly crucial and prevalent in assigned counsel systems, in
which differing judges set standards unto themselves.242
Of all the factors which are frequently emphasized in denying counsel, the
posting of bail seems the least defensible. This is clearly true of those defendants
who borrowed money to secure their release and cannot borrow further. This
is equally true of defendants who chose to spend their own money to obtain
(1972) to the effect that "The standard should not be so high that it includes clients who
can pay the fee of an attorney without jeopardizing their ability to have decent food, clothing
and shelter." This same test appears in several state public defender statutes such as New
Jersey's:
Need shall be measured according to the financial ability of the defendant to
engage and compensate competent private counsel and to provide all other necessary
expenses of representation. Such ability shall be recognized to be a variable depend-
ing on the nature, extent and liquidity of assets and on the disposable net income
of the defendant on the one hand, and on the nature of the charge, the effort and
skill required to gather pertinent information, render advice, conduct trial or render
other legal services and probable expenses to be incurred, on the other hand. N. J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-14 (1971).
See Note, 3 SBTON HALL L. REV. 214, 224 (1971).
237 ABA STANDARDS ON THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.3(a) (Approved Draft, 1971). See
Note, Eligibility for Appointed Counsel in Criminal Cases, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 243, 254-60
(1968).
238 Bing and Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 422.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 107-08; Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in
Oregon, 44 ORE. L. Rv. 255 264 (1965); Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in
Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. Rav. 1, 28
(1963).
242 See THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 41.
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release and are left with no assets to retain counsel. Denial of counsel would im-
properly force an accused to choose between two equally valuable constitutional
rights,243 both necessary to proper preparation for trial." It is difficult to con-
ceive of any social value to be served by forcing such a choice on an accused,
particularly since requiring money bail of an accused is itself a largely discredited
practice. Both the Criminal Justice Act and the American Bar Association
Standards4 clearly contemplate appointing counsel for those released on bail.
It seems equally improper, in considering an accused's resources, to con-
sider assets of others.24 It is generally not clear that there is any legal duty to
provide counsel for others, even between parent and child. Even if the contrary
were true, imputing resources not available in reality would deny due process.24
In any event, such an approach serves to discourage use of counsel, a result in-
consistent with public policy. Most states4 and the American Bar Association
Standards 49 therefore ignore assets of others in determining eligibility.
Equally irrelevant are future or potential assets or income. Every poor
person could earn or acquire more property in order to employ counsel. While
doing so might provide income for an attorney, it might at the same time disrupt
lives or simply lead to unrepresented defendants. Thus any financial test for
provision of counsel should properly relate to presently existing resources."' The
potential for earning income may be relevant only as a basis for doubting
protestations of present poverty."'
Finally, merit is an improper consideration in appointing counsel. Some
trial courts may use counsel as either punishment or reward, depending on who
is and who is not viewed as "deserving." Subjective good faith, the Supreme
Court has held,2" is irrelevant in in forma pauperis appeals; a fortiori, it should
play no part in providing counsel. While an in forma pauperis criminal appeal
243 As Silverstein observes, supra note 239, some jurisdictions quixotically revoke the bond
of defendants before appointing counsel. See United States v. Scharf, 354 F. Supp. 450, 452(E.D. Pa. 1973).
244 See Note, supra note 167, at 771-72.
245 ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS: DEFENSE SERVICES § 6.1(c) (Approved Draft, 1968).
246 The former practice with in forma pauperis civil litigation of considering the assets of
the plaintiff's attorney has been rejected. Adkins v. E. L. DuPont, 335 U.S. 331 (1948);
Isrin v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 153, 403 P.2d 728 (1965); Duniway, The Poor Man in
the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270 (1966).
247 Sze United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 410 U.S. 924 (1973); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
248 See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 109. See also State v. Owen, 339 P.2d 663 (Ariz.
1965) ; Lawrence v. State, 76 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1954).
249 ABA MINI Mu STANDARDS: DEFENSE SERVICES § .1(b) (Approved Draft, 1968).
250 Cf. Williams v. Field, 394 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that in forma pau-
peris prisoners' suits should not be allowed unless exceptional circumstances preclude deferring
suits). See also Earls v. Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County, 98 Cal. Rptr. 302 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1971). See Rothstein, Criteria for Appointment of Counsel in Massachusetts Crim-
inal Cases, 6 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 855, 858 (1972).
251 See, e.g., Roberts v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 316 F. Supp. 133, 134 (D. Minn.
1970):
There is something incongruous in an application [for an in forma pauperis appeal]
by one who has earned as much as did plaintiff during his last five years of employ-
ment and who claims now he is unable to earn anything. . . . His earning ability
and capacity in the court's opinion should be sufficient to enable him, if he is sincere
in his belief, to garner sufficient earnings to finance the cost of his appeal.
252 See Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1270, 1283
(1966); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 356
U.S. 674 (1958); Lovelace v. Haskins, 474 F.2d 1254, 1255 (6th Cir. 1973).
[October 1974]
[Vol. 50:41] CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS FOR THE POOR
may be denied if frivolous,"' counsel may not be so conditioned. The role of
counsel is that of advocate, not amicus curiae. 54 Only after counsel is provided
can an accused's case be evaluated and presented, however inadequate it may
be." ' If this is true of appellate counsel, after a full trial, it is clearly true of trial
counsel prior to any exploration or development of the defendant's position.
Financial eligibility is perhaps the single area in which courts have most
fully exercised the rule-making power urged in this article. The confusion and
abuses in this area are therefore significant for court rule-making in other areas
of defense services. Essentially, difficulty has arisen because the courts did not
allow the rules to be administered by the responsible professionals. Instead,
judges often administer the standards in an adversary setting, injecting irrelevant
values on a scanty record to deny counsel.
Public defense is a public service, like welfare, education, or civil legal aid,
best administered by those responsible for the service. The prosecution and the
courts have no exclusive interest or expertise in denying counsel. The courts
should help to establish the criteria; certainly they should provide review for
anyone aggrieved. But their rule-making responsibilities should not extend to
case-by-case administration. As with civil legal services programs, administration
can be entrusted to the board and staff of the defense program.
3. Misdemeanor Cases
The preceding sections concerning who makes the eligibility decision and by
what standards have made several references to the Supreme Court's decision
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, requiring counsel in misdemeanor cases where im-
prisonment seems likely. That holding has many implications, two of which
warrant further exploration here. The first relates to the financial eligibility
standard which should be employed in misdemeanor appointments. The second
involves the difficulty of predicting the "probability" of imprisonment early
enough to appoint counsel in time to be effective.
One factor which has assumed particular importance since Argersinger is
the smaller attorney's fee usually charged misdemeanants. The obvious inference
is that an accused may be able to afford misdemeanor counsel when, with the
same resources, felony counsel could not be retained." 6 This would lead to a
more restrictive extension of counsel in misdemeanor cases.
253 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 2253 (1970); Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis
Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 347, 360 (1967).
254 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958); Leser v. United States, 335 F.2d
832, 833 (9th Cir. 1964); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); ABA STANDARDS ON
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft, 1971).
255 Thus in in forma pauperis appeals, even where the district court certifies there is no
merit, counsel must be appointed to challenge the certificate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970);
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962); Hardy v. United States, 375 U. S.
277 (1964); Ellis v Unit 'd S ates, 356 U.S. 674. 675 (1958); Johnson v. United States,
352 U.S. 565 (1957); Moon v. United States, 422 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Tate v.
United States, 359 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal
Courts, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1270 (1966).
256 Sep Comment Th, ':"ht ot the Indigent Misdemeanant to Appointed Counsel, 16
S.D. L. REv. 400, 410 (1971); Note, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 214, 231 (1971); People v.
Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 315, 213 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting). See
IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PRESCRIPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE at 8.
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A number of factors argue the contrary. The basic premise of Argersinger
is that counsel is necessary in base-line trial courts to bring justice to the lower
levels of justice. The only exposure to the criminal process for the majority of
Americans is in misdemeanor courts and prosecutions. That exposure is often
a rude shock, involving shabby facilities and procedures 5 For those familiar
with low-level mass justice machinery, the uniform impression is that mass
injustice is the uniform result.
As with lineup and interrogation procedures, a massive infusion of counsel
is needed not simply as an aid to individuals but as a corrective to the system.
Such an approach is also necessary to prevent wholesale and unwitting waivers of
valid defenses, and the American Bar Association Standards258 require consulta-
tion with counsel before counsel can be waived. This is especially important in
mass justice courts where, as noted earlier, Mr. Justice Douglas has observed
there is an "obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the
result."25 The President's Crime Commission in 1967 reached a similar con-
clusion.2"' This very "obsession with speed" makes speed imperative in providing
counsel. There may not be time to seek private counsel; indeed, there may be-
as many judges have observed-no time even to investigate financial eligibility
fully. There may barely be time to appoint counsel in order to enable the accused
to survive the whirlwind pace of the treadmill of justice.
Quite apart from this, a financial eligibility standard based on the distinc-
tion between felonies and misdemeanors rests on uncertain ground. Such dis-
tinctions have been rejected in other contexts concerning transcripts and changes
of venue. 6' The felony-misdemeanor distinction does not govern in jury cases
under the Sixth Amendment.262 It is not an appropriate measure of the need
for counsel, for as Justice Douglas observed in Argersinger,265 the complexity of
the law and facts of a case have little relationship to the felony/misdemeanor
dichotomy.
Indeed, one could argue that the greater seriousness of felonies has led to
greater care by lawmakers, prosecutors, and judges. The greatest need for
reform of the law to protect civil liberties would then be in the misdemeanor
area. The brief of the Legal Aid Society of New York in Argersinger reviewed
their extensive experience in representing misdemeanants and concluded tersely
257 See generally Bing and Rosenfeld, supra note 44; THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY, supra note 199.
258 ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS: DEFENSE SERVICES (Approved Draft, 1968).
259 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
260 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 199, at 128:
An inevitable consequence of volume that large is the almost total preoccupation
in such a court with the movement of cases. The calendar is long, speed is often
substituted for care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise too often is sub-
stituted for adjudication. Inadequate attention tends to be given to the individual
defendant whether in protecting his rights, sifting the facts at trial, deciding the
social risks he presents, or determining how to deal with him after conviction. The
frequent result is futility and failure.
261 See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 187 (1971) (holding that in forma pauperis tran-
scripts could not be denied misdemeanants); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 '(1971)
(changes of venue cannot be prohibited in misdemeanor prosecutions).
262 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970).
263 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
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that they knew "that the prevalence of legal insufficiency and outright innocence
is far greater in the lesser offense category."26 ' Misdemeanor prosecutions are
often used to control deviance, marital discord, social unrest, and defiance of
authority. In many instances, they offer an effective vehicle for personal ha-
rassment and discriminatory law enforcement. Counsel may curb these practices
or promote changes in the law that makes them possible28 The importance of
these functions to basic concepts of liberty has little to do with either the term
"misdemeanor" or "felony." The appropriate conclusion would be that financial
eligibility standards in misdemeanor cases should be at least as expansive and
inclusive as in felony cases.
The Supreme Court in Argersinger added the further eligibility require-
ment that counsel need be afforded only in those misdemeanor cases involving
a risk of imprisonment. This necessitates a prediction prior to trial as to the
likely outcome of a case. 68 Such predictions may be beyond the competence of
many defense attorneys, prosecutors, or judges. Even if not, there is always a risk
of error if the decision is made by someone other than a judge and a risk of
prejudice if a judge makes it 67 If the judge denies counsel, in effect he has
forfeited a valuable right for elimination of incarceration; if counsel is appointed,
the judge may thereby stigmatize the accused as fit for imprisonment, thus pre-
judging the case. These risks, coupled with the general value of counsel, argue
for providing counsel in any case where imprisonment is possible by law."s
Defender services should embrace as well prosecutions which cannot lead
to incarceration but which are nevertheless of considerable significance. It is
important to emphasize here that provision of defense services for prosecutions
leading to incarceration is the minimum range of desired services. This would
be true whether the offense was denominated "petty," "misdemeanor," or
"traffic."
The need for representation may flow from collateral consequences to a
particular defendant, as where conviction may mean the loss of employment
or driver's license or the establishment of civil liability in a collateral proceeding
(e.g., bastardy or nonsupport). It may inhere in the nature of the offense.
Sex cases may involve unwarranted stigmatization and vagrancy cases may
provide a tool for police harassment. Finally, a prosecution not leading to
incarceration may nevertheless be significant because it involves proceedings
which particularly and unfairly oppress the defender client population, as with
many petty vice matters, welfare fraud, bad debt prosecutions, and breaches of
264 Brief for the Legal Aid Society of New York as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
265 See Part II, Section D supra, with respect to law reform.
266 See generally Gilliard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
267 See discussion in Part V, Section B, Subsection 1 supra; THE OTHER FACE OF JUS C
at 63-64, where appointment of counsel because imprisonment seems likely is described as
attaching a "red flag" to a defendant.
268 ABA MINIMUM STANDmAIS: DEFENSE SERVICES § 4.1 (Approved Draft, 1968) pro-
vide otherwise:
Counsel should be provided in all criminal proceedings for offenses by loss of liberty,
except those types of offenses for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed,
regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors or otherwise.
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the peace involving either domestic quarrels or disputes with creditors or land-
lords.
In all of these cases, imprisonment may not be at stake. The stigma of
the word "felony" may not be involved. Yet important interests of indigent
defendants may be in jeopardy. The defender program must view itself as
providing social services, as being accountable to a specific constituency, and as
having as its mandate the responsibility of relieving the criminal aspects of
poverty. Certainly court supervision of defense services does not require limiting
defense services to the minimum mandated by the sixth amendment.
4. Eligibility: A Further Range
The preceding comments have summarized the practices and proposals
concerning eligibility tests for indigent defense. They present at best a standard
in disarray. On the one hand, the constitutional rhetoric has extolled the
central place of counsel in a due process scheme which emphasizes adversary
development of the truth. At the same time, the courts in practice have shown
a recurring and begrudging disinclination to provide counsel. Vague and
arbitrary tests of indigency and merit, limitations to felony prosecutions or those
leading to incarceration, imposition of court review on appointment, denial of
experts, investigators, and transcripts-all of these bespeak a practice and a
reality curiously inconsistent with the rhetoric.
The vagueness and inadequacy of standards and the frequency of abuse
argue for abandonment of the old approaches and for a broader, simpler test
of eligibility. Quite simply phrased, it would afford counsel and supporting
services whenever the state proceeds against an accused without regard to his
financial ability or the merit of his defense. This approach would increase the
price of prosecution, requiring the state to consider more carefully whether to
make acts criminal or to proceed with a prosecution in a particular case. It
would decrease the penalty imposed by way of counsel fees upon the innocent
and make the litigation of innocence far more attractive. A saner system of
criminal justice and laws would result.
Affording public counsel in every case would remove many anomalies
which occur daily in the criminal courts. It would mean that the artificial dis-
tinction between the complainant, who is represented by the prosecuting counsel,
and the defendant, who must seek counsel, would vanish. In prosecutions of
auto accidents, rape, assault, domestic breach of peace, and many other offenses,
it is often unclear whether the "victim" is the accuser or the accused. Yet only
the accused must pay the price of counsel. In these cases, the party who wins
the race to the courthouse is provided counsel-the prosecutor-by the state.
Counsel is arbitrarily denied the person who is slow afoot.
Affording public counsel to all defendants would also operate to relieve
injustice in those cases where there are no victims. Prosecutions for alcohol-
related offenses, drug offenses, gambling, and petty vice offenses do not deal
with "wrongs" so much as the basic notion that a benevolent state has an
obligation to rehabilitate the accused, to protect him from himself. The public
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interest in an addict is not in punishment, but in salvage. Why then must he
bear the cost of the public interest? That cost, the cost of counsel, is more
properly borne by the public.
Further, many prosecutions never lead to rehabilitation or treatment. The
reason is simply that facilities and methods often do not exist for dealing with
those, such as addicts, deviants, or simple nonconformists, who are prosecuted
for deviant acts. Such prosecutions are frustrated ab inita. It is strange indeed
for the state to force an individual to the expense of trial and retaining counsel
when the ultimate defense is that the state failed-at the outset-to provide the
very prerequisites which might ultimately have made conviction worthwhile.
Finally, recent history documents the price which must be paid by those
who would express dissent against the policies of a political regime which uses
prosecution as punishment. The cost of defending prosecutions has priced the
first amendment out of the marketplace of free ideas, which it was intended
to preserve. In a free society, rejection of ideas is the appropriate penalty for
the wrongheaded. Instead, in this decade at least, to this penalty has been
added the fearful burden of defending political trials, including the heavy cost
of counsel. Relief from that cost would encourage free expression of ideas.
There are fundamental reasons for providing counsel to the accused as
well as the accuser as a precondition to prosecution. The only counterargument
is cost. This argument is not so much a statement of fiscal responsibility as a
rephrasing of value judgments. Those who say there is no money only mean
that it would be ill-spent, that the accused somehow deserve to be punished
for presumed misdeeds, that they do not merit public counsel, and that they
must bear the penalty of the cost of prosecution. Such views are out of touch
with low-level, mass-production criminal courts where justice and injustice are
often difficult to distinguish. They are equally inconsistent with the lofty theo-
retical structures of a jurisprudence which presumes innocence and imposes
penalties only after expensive due process.
The logic of providing counsel to all seems unimpeachable. The structures,
however, do not presently exist and the resources, though available, may never be
allocated. The idea is admittedly visionary. Until its time comes, as did the
time for Gideon and Argersinger, the courts as administrative rule-makers must
confine themselves to what is now possible. Accordingly, this article turns to
the question of what services should be provided to those deemed eligible for
public defense counsel.
C. Case Services
1. Trials and Review Proceedings
The simplest description of services to be rendered by public defense systems
is that adopted by the Model Public Defender Act. In its Prefatory Note, the
Act adopts the model of parity discussed earlier, without detailing the contours
of required services, by providing that "whatever the Supreme Court says it
consists of for persons of adequate means, the needy person is entitled to the
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same protection ... and to have it paid for by the state."26 The Act provides
further that a needy person is entitled "to be counseled and defended at all
stages of the matter beginning with the earliest time when a person providing
his own counsel would be entitled."2 7
The Model Act, A.B.A. Standards, and N.A.C. Standards, as well as most
defender programs, all provide trial-level services: presentment, bail, prelimi-
nary hearing, arraignment, and sentencing. Appeals are also appropriate for
public defense counsel. While there may be no due process right to an appeal,
the Supreme Court has held that an indigent must not be denied access to
appellate remedies open to the affluent."' The expenses of fees, transcripts, and
counsel must be borne by the state if necessary to enable an indigent defendant
to appeal.
272
Counsel for the poor are usually available from the earliest time retained
counsel would be available. It is at the end of the process that distinctions are
drawn between the wealthy and the poor.172 Many statutes condition in formra
pauperis appeals upon merit. 4 This should be permissible only if the wealthy
appellant faces the same obstacle.7 5 In the federal courts at least, the indigent
accused must have the assistance of counsel to help him make his showing of
merit." 6 Counsel must function as an advocate, not amicus curiaeY7
Appellate services should not be conditioned on the subjective "good faith"
of the defendant . 8 In the federal courts, it is clear that in formra pauperis
appeals may not be so conditionedY.9 As the Supreme Court said in Ellis v.
United States:
[This] applicant's good faith is established by the presentation of any issue
that is not plainly frivolous. [Citations omitted.] The good-faith test must
not be converted into a requirement of a preliminary showing of any
particular degree of merit. Unless the issues raised are so frivolous that
the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant ... the
269 Prefatory Note, p. 270.
270 Section 2(b) (1).
271 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
272 See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd.
of Prisons and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 356 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959). But see Ross v. Moffit, 414 U.S. 909 (1973), holding that there is no
constitutional right to counsel in discretionary appeals to a state's supreme court or to the
United States Supreme Court, after an appeal as of right to a state's intermediate appellate
court.
273 See § 6(b) of Proposed Bill, Appendix to Anderson, supra note 65.
274 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970).
275 See, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963).
276 Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); Tate v. United States, 359 F.2d 245
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
277 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958):
Normally, allowance of an appeal should not be denied until an indigent has had
an adequate representation by counsel. . . . In this case, it appears that the two
attorneys appointed by the Court of Appeals performed essentially the role of amici
curiae. But representation in the role of an advocate is required.
278 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962), construing 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(1970), which requires good faith as a condition of allowing an in forma pauperis appeal.
279 See generally Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas
Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343 (1967); Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18
STAN. L. Rav. 1270 (1966).
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request of an indigent for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be
allowed.28 0
In effect, the subjective good faith test has been eliminated from in forma pau-
peris appeals, a test of substantive frivolity having been substituted."
As to transcripts, the Supreme Court in Brit v. North Carolina28 2 has held
that a state must provide transcripts where needed for appeals. An alternative
means would suffice, as where the accused might arrange for the reporter to
read back his notes. But the indigent defendant need not rely upon his own
memory. 3 or the notes of counsel.8 4 Griffin v. Illinois' 5 requires a "record of
sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of claims."2' s This is true
whether the case is a misdemeanor or felony prosecution8 7 and applies both to
trials and preliminary hearings.88
While transcripts-or adequate substitutes--are generally available for
appeals, the law relating to collateral attack may be somewhat different. In
Smith v. United Spates,2 19 the Sixth Circuit in a § 2255 case said:
In general, indigents are not accorded a right to a free transcript. The
basis of this rule being to prevent the wasting of court time on frivolous
appeals. It is assumed that, absent special circumstances, a man in custody
can recall sufficiently the circumstances of a non-frivolous error to frame
an appropriate motion to vacate sentence.
Such a view seems untenable, particularly when compared with the relative
availability of transcripts on appeal when the trial events are relatively fresh
in the defendant's memory. In contrast, postconviction relief may be sought
months or years later, increasing rather than diminishing the need for a tran-
script. Nevertheless, as to collateral attack it is frequently said that a "partic-
ularized need" for a transcript must be shown,290 relating to evidentiary chal-
lenges of arguable merit.2 9 '
Limitations concerning merit in appeals and collateral attack proceedings
are inexplicably inconsistent with defense services at trial, which are not similarly
conditioned. Rejecting such limitations, Section 4.2 of the A.B.A. Standards on
the Defense Function provides:
Counsel should be provided in all proceedings arising from the initiation
of a criminal action against the accused, including extradition, mental
competency, post-conviction and other proceedings which are adversary in
280 356 U.S. at 674-75 (1958).
281 Duniway, supra note 279, at 1283.
282 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
283 Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1969).
284 Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prisons and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 215 (1958).
285 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
286 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971). See also Almarez v. Carpenter, 347 F.
Supp. 597 (D. Col. 1972); United States v. Young, 472 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1972).
287 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971). See also Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S.
505 (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 459 (1969).
288 As to preliminary hearings, see Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
289 421 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1970).
290 See, e.g., Bozeman v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1262, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1973).
291 See, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1963).
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nature, regardless of the designation of the court in which they occur or
classification of the proceedings as civil in nature.
Perhaps the appropriate approach here should be that taken in In re Gault92
with juveniles or with parole hearings in Gagne v. Scarpelli:292 weigh the due
process need of and consequences for the state and the citizen in a particular
proceeding. Counsel should then be provided, even if not constitutionally man-
dated, when the state has deprived the individual of something of value. In a
similar analysis, the right to retained counsel was found to attach in civil con-
texts such as welfare and consumer matters.2 94
Appointment of counsel is as vital to liberty at the time of habeas corpus
or coram nobis as at the very beginning of the criminal process. Indeed, the
complexity of criminal law becomes compounded by the procedural difficulties
of collateral relief when a prisoner seeks-years after the fact-to challenge a
conviction. His need for counsel and related services at that time becomes
proportionately greater.
Most proposals and defense systems extend representation of defendants
to postconviction collateral attacks."9 5 This is true of the Model Public Defender
Act.2"' The National Advisory Commission of Criminal Justice has advocated
that public defense counsel undertake appeals, collateral attack proceedings,
and parole or probation revocation proceedings."' While this is not constitution-
ally required," 8 it is justified by the complexity of the proceedings, their relation-
ship to the criminal process, and their importance to successful imprisonment:
Extending the availability of representation to inmates involved in matters
other than attacks upon convictions would tend to lessen the dehumanization
process of the penitentiary. It would provide the inmate with someone
from outside the institutional setting who would take a personal interest in
him.2 9 9
Defense services of such scope seem clearly appropriate, though they may
go beyond the constitutional minimum. The role of counsel in assuring justice
at the beginning of the criminal process is no less vital at the end. The challenge
thus posed must be met jointly by the courts and legislatures: to structure a
defense system with services coterminous with the system of prosecution.
2. Civil Actions of Defendants in Custody
A defendant represented by assigned counsel or a defender program who
becomes incarcerated should be afforded representation on matters related and
unrelated to his custody, so long as he remains in custody. Litigation concerning
292 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
293 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
294 See Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
295 See, e.g., proposed bill in Appendix to Anderson, supra note 65.
296 Section 2(b) (1).
297 Courts Standard 13.4.
298 See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
299 Courts Standard 13.4.
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his sentence and conditions of confinement should be undertaken, regardless of
the forum. Assistance concerning other matters, such as family or credit prob-
lems, should also be provided.
Such services vitally affect a defendant's life. The experience and rehabili-
tation of incarceration are negatively influenced if the prisoner believes himself
unfairly committed or unfairly treated while in confinement. Prisons are part of
the criminal justice system and legal services should extend into the prisons.
Similarly, it is difficult to adjust to prison life if outside problems depress an
already troubled existence. This is particularly true of misdemeanants, for
whom custody may flow from marital, social, or financial problems which have
sequelae while the offender is in custody.
The proposal is that public defenders and assigned counsel represent their
clients after they enter custody. Neither the A.B.A. nor N.L.A.D.A. has made
similar recommendations, perhaps because such representation is not considered
"criminal" or is thought to be offered by civil legal services programs. The
former reflects a formalistic superficiality; the latter ignores the importance of
total client service and continuity of representation. In addition, many prisons
are deliberately located in rural areas and are not presently reached by civil
legal services.
The language quoted earlier 0 0 from the National Advisory Commission
to justify appellate, collateral, and parole representation also warrants repre-
senting prisoners on other legal problems. The Commission in section 2.2(5) of
Standards on Corrections urges legal services to include "civil legal problems
relating to debts, marital status, property or other personal affairs of the
offender." The case for providing civil representation to prisoners was also
succinctly stated at the National Defender Conference in 1969 as follows:
I truly think it is futile to provide a defendant with an effective counsel
in a criminal case while permitting his home or other property to be taken
away from him because he has no representation in a civil case.30
Much prisoners' litigation, of course, relates to conditions of custody. In
presenting such suits, public counsel may encounter considerable resistance.
Although the number of federal suits by state prisoners has risen astonishingly
in the past decade, a high percentage are dismissed. The federal courts often
have dismissed such suits on the threshold application to proceed in forma
pauperis, °2 thus denying any adversary hearing or the assistance of counsel.0 3
Some courts, in dealing with prisoners' litigation, have imposed more demanding
standards than those faced by the wealthy.0 Where the prisoner seeks to pro-
ceed in forma pauperii, the application has been denied although a cause of
300 See note 297 supra.
301 Statement of Attorney General Mitchell, DEFENDER CONFERENCE REPORT at 12.
302 See, e.g., Williams v. Field, 394 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1968).
303 See, e.g., Boag v. Boies, 455 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1972); Reinke v. Waworth County
Sheriff, 282 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Davison v. Joseph Home & Co., 265 F. Supp. 750
(W.D. Pa. 1967).
304 Conway v. Fugge, 439 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1971): "The district courts have especially
broad discretion to decline to entertain civil actions in forma pauperis by prison inmates
against their wardens and other prison officials."
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action is alleged? 5 In adopting this approach, the Ninth Circuit commented:
[Ilt is not inappropriate to consider, along with other circumstances, the
fact that the appellant is a state prisoner undertaking to recover money
from his custodian, a state official, and that, in the prosecution of his
suit, he seeks a special statutory privilege, namely, the financial support
of the federal government.3 0 6
Contrary to these views, prisoners' litigation should be freely encouraged
and fully considered. At a minimum, it should not be subject to a more stringent
standard simply because it often proceeds in forma pauperis. In Lockhart v.
D'Urso,0 7 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a refusal to allow an
in forma pauperis prisoner's suit:
[W]hile there may be extreme circumstances where such a right should be
denied for plain lack of merit, we think that, particularly in pro se cases,
the right to proceed in forma pauperis should generally be granted where
the required affidavit of poverty is filed. This approach minimizes, to some
extent, disparity in treatment based on economic circumstances. An attack
on the truth of such affidavit or the sufficiency of the complaint should be
left for appropriate disposition after service has been made on the defen-
dants.
The Third Circuit's approach finds clear support in Supreme Court deci-
sions which have held that prisoner litigation is to be held to a lesser standard
of pleading in order that prisoners' pro se complaints might be heard."" Of
course, the discussion at the beginning of this article concerning parity becomes
relevant here. It is contrary to fundamental notions of equal protection for
courts to discriminate against classes of litigants in the belief that conditions
of poverty or custody deprive their complaints of merit.
A comprehensive defender service would undertake prisoners' litigation
by following its clients into jail or prison. As with the model of the O.E.O. legal
services program, the services would be rendered to a total client, not to a "case"
or even a legal category of services such as "criminal." Prisoners would receive
legal services related to their convictions, such as appeals or collateral challenges,
and services related to their personal situations, such as marital or debtor-
creditor matters. The constituency and the responsibility are coterminous and
the human needs of prisoners should be served.
D. Caseload and Effectiveness of Counsel
There is a vast amount of litigation concerning the effectiveness of counsel.
As noted at the beginning of this article, most of it inquires into services rendered
in a particular case. Such inquiries often focus on the point in the proceeding
at which counsel was appointed, the amount of time he spent with his client or
305 Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1963).
306 Williams v. Field, 394 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1968).
307 408 F.2d 354, 355 (3d Cir. 1969).
308 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
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in preparation, his advice prior to plea, or his advocacy during trial. Convictions
are rarely reversed since reversal requires a finding of ineffectiveness or incom-
petence. Courts are loathe to make such findings, since standards are unclear
and after-the-fact evaluations involve second-guessing difficult judgments, stig-
matizing an attorney, and forcing a retrial. Thus postconviction review is a
poor device for ensuring the effective assistance of counsel and protecting indi-
gent defendants.
A better method would be to take the prospective approach urged in this
article and to establish standards which would provide "counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance of counsel." 3 9 By
far the most important single factor would be to establish caseload standards.
The uniform conclusion of those familiar with the criminal courts and public
defender systems is that the generally poor quality of defense services results
largely from excessive caseloads. With a light caseload, even a minimally com-
petent attorney can function well. But the best attorney cannot render even
minimally competent services under the caseloads faced by many public de-
fenders.
Not surprisingly, the District Court in Wallace v. Kern focused on case-
loads310 in attempting to provide an effective delivery of services by the New
York Legal Aid Society. It noted that many clients were never seen while in
custody, that each defendant often saw a different attorney at each court appear-
ance, that attorneys rarely did investigations, and that counseling and advice
were hurried or nonexistent. 1 ' Testimony indicated that these shoddy services
were due to an average caseload of ninety cases per attorney. Private attorneys
testified, in contrast, that adequate services required a maximum caseload of
twenty-five to thirty active cases. 12 The court, in exasperation, noted:
Citywide officials of Legal Aid oppose the setting of maximum caseloads
because cases are not all alike and attorneys differ in ability. . . . One
citywide executive said he could prepare ten felony cases in a week. The
statement, if true, would be an extreme example of accommodation to an
unsatisfactory system. The court gives it no credence.3' 3
The district court then summarized the findings of three separate studies
of the defense services in New York's criminal courts. Each had contrasted
the public defender services with those of private attorneys and found the
former wanting and caseloads too high. 1 The court concluded that a case-
load of 100 was intolerable, and ordered that a maximum average active case-
load throughout the program be forty cases. This would allow some individual
fluctuation and flexibility, yet if a felony case took an average of four months
from start to finish, it would mean an average of 100 cases per year rather than
at any one time as had been the practice.
309 West v. State of Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1973).
310 See also Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213, 221 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Chatman, 42 U.S.L.W. 2593 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 7, 1974).
311 Wallace v. Kern, supra note 22, Memorandum Opinion at 9-14.
312 Id. at 7-10.
313 Id. at 14-15.
314 Id. at 26-29.
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Wallace v. Kern is the first case to take such an approach and the first au-
thority to set such a low maximum for caseload. Yet it did so in the light of
three extensive studies and direct testimony. It did so as well without com-
promising because of cost, politics, or "practicality," basing its findings solely
on the experience of its experts-certainly consistent with the author's own expe-
rience-concerning the minimum requisites for effective counsel. In contrast,
other studies or proposals concerning case load are curiously ambiguous and
ambivalent, torn by the "politics" of choosing between what is needed and
what is available.
As to caseload, the A.B.A. Standards provide simply that "A lawyer should
not accept more employment than he can discharge within the spirit of the
constitutional mandate for speedy trial and the limits of his capacity to give
each client effective representation." '15 While this is a useful hortatory declara-
tion, it provides no guide for an administrator to determine how to divide a
caseload among his staff. Caseload maxima have been prescribed by others
but are hardly more helpful. One study suggests that there should be full-time
public defenders when 300 appointments are made annually in a district
court. 16 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement estimated that an
attorney could undertake three to four hundred serious misdemeanors, twelve
hundred social nuisance matters, or six hundred middle-range misdemeanor
cases, . 1 requiring 6,300 to 9,200 attorneys nationwide." 8 The National Advi-
sory Commission on Criminal Justice has formulated caseload maxima per
attorney as follows: 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200
mental health cases, or 25 appeals.1 9 It recommends that if a public defender
finds that more cases "might reasonably lead to inadequate representation in
cases handled by him," he should request the court not to assign further cases
to him.3 ' The Airlie House Conference in 1966 had suggested maxima of
150 felonies or 300 to 1000 misdemeanors per attorney.3 2'
It may be of some value to note that in 1970, N.L.A.D.A. revised its civil
caseload guidelines, providing that "the caseload of the legal staff of the organ-
ization should allow each lawyer to give to every client the time and effort the
case requires."32 The Comment suggests a maximum of 500 civil cases per
attorney annually on an estimate that 20 percent will involve litigation and
40 percent may be terminated after the initial interview. Curiously, the
N.L.A.D.A. guidelines say nothing as to criminal caseloads.
The recent study by N.L.A.D.A., The Other Face of Justice, sought na-
tional caseload statistics. On the average, public defenders undertake 173
felonies or 483 misdemeanor cases annually. This is well above the N.A.C.
315 ABA STANDARDS ON THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 1.2(d) (Approved Draft, 1971).
316 Oaks, The Criminal Justice Act in the Federal District Courts-A Summary and
Postscript, 7 Am. Ct im. L.Q. 210, 217-18 (1969).
317 TASK FORCE REPORTS: THE COURTS at 56.
318 See also Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IoWA L. REv.
1249, 1258-61 (1970).
319 Courts Standard 13.12.
320 Id.
321 Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389,
393 (1966).
322 Courts Standard 6.
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Standards. But the respondents all indicated that even those standards were
too high and that a maximum felony caseload should be in the area of 80 to 140
cases annually. 2 This accords with the experience of the author and the experts
who testified in Wallace v. Kern as noted earlier.
Such caseload figures leave many questions unanswered. The meaning of
ccase," for example, may or may not include preliminary hearings or appeals.
The services rendered may vary and in some estimates often exclude preliminary
hearings and motions or jury trials. The bald figures, without more, often im-
peach themselves. If the private practitioners in Wallace v. Kern could under-
take only thirty active cases, how can anyone believe that any attorney can
undertake two, three, or four hundred? What is being lost in the process?
A study of the Philadelphia defender office indicates that major sex cases
took an average of 10.5 hours, major violence cases took an average of 5.5
hours, other major felony cases took an average of 3.75 hours, and minor or
misdemeanor matters averaged 3.3 hours.324 "Economies" were being effected
so that such minimal times could be spent. The study criticized the defender
assembly-line methods used in such representation. These were precisely the
practices rejected in Wallace u. Kern, and which could be justified only on the
ground that they were dictated by the pressures of time.
Such "economies" are often effected. Pretrial investigations may be con-
ducted by nonprofessionals; indeed, they may conduct the client interviews.
Pretrial motions may be foregone; and preliminary hearings may be waived.
Cases may be claimed for bench trials to avoid the time consumed before the
jury. Appeals may be foregone. Cases may be traded off against each other;
plea bargaining may become mass production.
A better name for such "economy" is ineffective assistance of counsel.
This was the point in Argersinger: high-volume justice may be no justice at
all. The danger is particularly acute with misdemeanors, where the stakes and
visibility are relatively low. It becomes tempting then to estimate that an
attorney can represent twice as many misdemeanor as felony clients, 25 since
the uniform assumption is that misdemeanors involve less work than felony
cases. 2 The reductio ad absurdum of this approach is the President's Commis-
sion's incredible estimate that attorneys can represent as many as 600 to 1,200
misdemeanor defendants.
The term "represent" loses all meaning in such a statement. An attorney
cannot interview 1,200 clients per year; it would require more than one-half of
his 2000 working hours. Even if he could conduct interviews, he cannot investi-
gate such a volume of cases. He cannot develop them fully before trial; he cannot
try even a handful. Appeals would not be possible. The President's Commis-
sion, by its caseload figure, would convert defense counsel into paper-shuffling
clerks.
323 THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 29.
324 Comment, Client Service in a Defender Organization: The Philadelphia Experience, 117
U. PA. L. Rav. 448, 456 (1969).
325 Brief for N.L.A.D.A. as Amicus Curiae at 11-13, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972); Allison and Phelps, Can We Afford to Provide Trial Counsel for the Indigent in
Misdemeanor Cases?, 13 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 75, 88 (1971) (based on N.L.A.D.A. survey).
326 See Part V, Section B, Subsection 2 supra.
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The standard justification for figures such as those discussed in the previous
section is that resources are inadequate to allow for smaller caseloads. However,
raising caseloads to intolerable heights is not the answer. Instead, selective limi-
tation of caseloads by eliminating certain kinds of cases is a preferable alternative.
The Supreme Court did this in Argersinger by excluding cases not involving a
risk of imprisonment. The 1970 N.L.A.D.A. Standards urge that in civil legal
services programs such limitations be made openly and with full participation
by the client constituency. 27 Since "adequate professional legal services are
divisible only to the point where they are no longer adequate professional legal
services, '  the means of selection might include residence, finances, categories
of cases, specialization of services, and caseload manipulation. Certainly one
appropriate approach would be to select those cases having greatest concern or
law reform potential for the poor."'
Limiting caseloads can be effected along quite different lines, each of which
may have a different rationale or affect quite a different segment of the popu-
lation.3 Cases involving vagrancy and public intoxication usually involve
different people and problems from drug-related or domestic relations matters.
Prosecutions involving housing, credit, and welfare uniquely affect the poor.
Cases with potential for decriminalization or screening of offenses may have
quite a different impact on the system from routine property offenses. Again,
offenses typically used for harassment or discrimination have unique impact and
significance for the poor. Any of these or other criteria might be chosen to
include or exclude cases in a way to increase service to the poor while still
reducing caseload."'
The soundest approach to caseload problems remains that taken in Wallace
v. Kern, prescribing an average maximum likely to assure effective counsel. It
is not enough to say that caseload is only one factor and caseload capabilities
vary depending upon counsel and case. The New York experience is typical, not
327 Comment to Standard 6, N.L.A.D.A. STANDARDS (1970). See Part IV, Section D supra.
328 Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46 J. URBAN L. 217, 223 (1969).
329 Id. at 245:
[P]rofessional standards of adequate legal services must include attention to the maxi-
mization of benefit to the client community as a whole for the available resources,
as well as safeguards to assure that such objectives do not conflict with the lawyer's
responsibility to his individual client.
330 See, e.g., Bellow, Reflections on Caseload Limitation, 27 LEG. AmD BRIEFCASE 195
(1969); Getzels, Legal Aid Cases Should Not Be Limited, 27 LEG. Anm BRiEFCASE 203 (1969).
331 'Comment to Standard 6, N.L.A.D.A. STANDARDS (1970). The N.L.A.D.A. Standards for
civil legal services programs suggest emphasis upon the cases which:
a. deal with a problem or grievances shared by a large number of persons served by
the organization or about which such persons feel strongly;
b. offer the possibility for enhancing the ability of the persons served by the organi-
zation to participate in the solving of neighborhood or community problems;
c. offer the possibility of increasing community understanding of a problem or issue
and of advancing the knowledge of the persons served by the organization with
respect to their legal rights and responsibilities;
d. foster or assist the development of leadership among the persons served by the
organization;
e. offer the possibility of enhancing the income potential and economic growth of the
persons seeking assistance or of the area in which the persons served by the organ-
ization reside;
f. offer the possibility of eliminating a practice or rule that affects a large number
of the persons generally served by the organization.
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unique. Caseload guides can be estimated and established and can be the most
effective pressure point for assuring that counsel will see clients, interview wit-
nesses, use pretrial alternatives, try cases, and-in short-be effective. Such
guides are well within the competence and responsibility of courts to prescribe,
as part of their general rule-making and supervisory powers. If society will
not provide the requisite resources, then the appropriate judicial response is to
dismiss the prosecution; that was the course chosen in United States v. Chat-
man 3 3'
VI. The Financing of Defense Systems
A. Compensation of Counsel
For years, public counsel were not compensated for their services. This
was rationalized in terms of a "duty" owed by the attorney. It should have
been self-evident, as the President's Commission observed, that the "duty"
concept imposed "a stigma of inferiority on the defense of the accused."' 3
Undoubtedly many uncompensated counsel gave unstintingly of their time and
rendered excellent services, but reliance upon unsupervised and unpredictable
charity is hardly a firm foundation for systematically meeting a societal obli-
gation.
The truth is that appointment without compensation constituted invidious
discrimination against both counsel.. and accused. Inadequate compensation
penalizes the attorney, of course, but it also impinges upon the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees to defendants. It means that they oftentimes receive the ser-
vices of inexperienced counsel or experienced counsel who feel they cannot
justify time expenditures at unacceptable levels of compensation." 5 Of course,
undercompensation may also mean services by incompetents."'
In some jurisdictions, in addition to receiving no compensation, counsel
have been required to assume the costs of defense. Even where compensation
may be adequate, judges may be reluctant to reimburse counsel for expenses
incurred in defending the indigent." 7 As noted earlier, such expenses are often
essential to an adequate defense and denial of reimbursement raises constitutional
questions concerning effectiveness and adequacy of counsel.
The law probably remains that counsel may be required to serve without
compensation. In United States v. Dillon, the Ninth Circuit stated the pre-
vailing view:
An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be
332 See 42 U.S.L.W. 2593 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 7, 1974).
333 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 61.
334 See State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 412, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966), where the Supreme
Court of New Jersey voided appointment without compensation as an unconstitutional taking
of property and as leading to inadequate services to defendants. See also Matter of Bedford, 22
Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968).
335 See Note, 45 TEAx. L. R v. 571, 572-73 (1967).
336 Id. at 574-76. See Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44 ORE. L.
Rnv. 255, 271 (1965).
337 See Part II, Section C supra.
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aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know
that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obl-
gated to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court order.
Thus, the lawyer has consented to, and assumed, this obligation and when
he is called upon to fulfill it, he cannot contend that it is a "taking of his
services."338
An overwhelming number of state courts have denied claims for nonstatutory
just compensation ;139 only three states have held the contrary. 40 The constitu-
tionality of such holdings is highly questionable, but has been largely avoided
because of the uniform adoption of legislation which, in varying degrees, provides
at least partial compensation.
The standards governing compensation are often unclear. With respect
to assigned counsel, the A.B.A. Standards provide:
Assigned counsel should be compensated for time and service necessarily
performed in the discretion of the court within limits specified by the appli-
cable statute. In establishing the limits and in the exercise of discretion
the objective should be to provide reasonable compensation in accordance
with prevailing standards.3 41
In practice, compensation of assigned counsel is generally conceded to be
substantially less than that of retained counsel. In one study, it was estimated
to be only about 40 percent of the compensation earned by retained counsel. 42
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State u. Rush343 has required that com-
pensation for appointed counsel be at least 60 percent of the minimum fee
schedule. In some states, it has been as low as $25 for a plea of guilty in a
misdemeanor case or $50 per day for trial."44 Maine is perhaps above the norm
in providing $15 per hour for out-of-court time and $150 per day for in-court
services in Superior Court, but below tolerable limits in allowing only $35 per
case in District Court. 43
With respect to full-time public defense counsel, the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice has recommended that salaries for public de-
fenders should be "comparable to that of attorney associates in local private law
firms." 4 At another point in the Standards, the National Advisory Commission
suggested treating the chief public defender's salary "in a similar manner to"
338 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
339 See Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1973).
340 Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405
(1940); Hall v. Washington County, 2 Iowa 473 (1850); County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis.
654 (1861). In both Iowa and Wisconsin it was subsequently held that appointed counsel
would be compensated only on the basis of statutory fee schedules. Samuels v. County of
Dubuque, 13 Iowa 536 (1862); Green Lake County v. Waupaca County, 113 Wis. 425, 89
N.W. 549 (1902).
341 ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS: DEFENSE SERVICES § 2.4 (Approved Draft, 1968).
342 Oaks, The Criminal Justice Act in the Federal District Courts-A Summary and Post-
script, 7 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 210, 219 (1969).
343 46 N.J. 399, 412, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966).
344 Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44 ORE. L REv. 255, 270
(1965).
345 Anderson, supra note 65, at 7-9.
346 Courts Standard 13.11.
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that of prosecutors or the chief judge of the highest trial court.17 The Model
Public Defender Act, in contrast, says nothing as to compensation of public
defenders."' The reality is that full-time public defenders generally are paid
less than prosecutors, with approximately half of them earning under $21,000
per year.3 49
At a minimum, compensation should be equal to that earned by a pros-
ecutor of similar experience and responsibility. The mathematics may be im-
precise. However, if a case assigned to an attorney involves unusual risk, expe-
rience, and time, then it would ordinarily be tried by a more experienced pros-
ecutor, earning perhaps $24,000 per year. The assigned counsel should receive
equivalent compensation.
This approach rejects the Criminal Justice Act approach of a flat hourly
rate and it rejects bar association fee schedules. Further, it is only a minimum
approach. The assigned attorney in the above case might be paid more to com-
pensate for lost income since substantial incursions on the time of private prac-
titioners may damage their practices. At a minimum, any approach must assure
economic parity of prosecution and defense, thus making possible parity of
expertise.
Any reference to "prevailing standards" should be carefully evaluated.
In some cases, the defender plan may be trying to improve prevailing standards
of criminal defense; the prevailing standards of compensation would thus be
inapposite. As to routine cases being used to challenge prevailing law, higher
standards of compensation may be appropriate for the higher skill required.
The A.B.A. Commentary makes no mention of law reform considerations,
although it notes the varying systems of compensation now in use. Because of
the dangers inherent in flexibility, the Commentary opts for prescription by a
court of hourly minima and maxima. The Commentary proposes compensation
only for services "necessarily performed," determined by reference to private
practice. The result may, in some instances, stifle the incentive for creative
advocacy urged elsewhere in this article. That incentive can best be enhanced
if compensation is left flexible and in the hands of a governing board, not the
courts, as with full-time defender programs and civil legal services programs.
Flexibility is indispensable in compensating misdemeanor assignments. Bar
association fee schedules customarily allow only minimal fees for misdemeanors.
Yet a case may take on great importance in terms of the complexity of the issues
raised, the impact on an accused or large segments of the population, or basic
considerations of justice. Misdemeanors may lead to fines, loss of jobs, and loss
of children; they may involve discriminatory laws or enforcement. All of these
may fall unfairly upon an identifiable segment of society. A defender office
should be free to weigh such considerations in assigning and compensating
counsel.
Creative advocacy is not inexpensive. The most competent counsel can
command premium compensation. If, as this article urges, defense systems are
347 Courts Standard 13.7.
348 Section 13.
349 THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 18; IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PREscniPTIVE
PRoGRAM PACKAGE at 15-17.
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to fulfill their public responsibilities, the courts must liberally interpret or even
create standards of compensation. Defendants and society at large cannot
long afford the sorry spectacle of a system in which one of the nation's leading
jurists parsimoniously reckons hundred dollar accounts, denying compensation
for necessary travel and waiting time,5 0 while district courts routinely grant
attorneys hundreds of thousands of dollars at $50 and $80 per hour for patent3 5'
and stockholder derivative suits. 52 This incongruity makes intolerable a system
of defense which remains embarrassingly wedded to outmoded concepts of
charity in what has become a crucial form of public assistance and constitutional
right.
B. Cost of Systems
Inevitably, social welfare proposals, of which defense systems are only one
example, encounter the problems of cost. This article has urged an increase in
quality and an expansion in scope of defense services. Even if the scope is
restricted to felony, misdemeanor and collateral services-excluding prisoner liti-
gation-the cost will be substantial. Any estimate is necessarily approximate,
but must begin with a consideration of the volume of cases needing services.
In 1965, 314,000 defendants were charged with felonies in state courts
and 24,000 in federal courts. 53 There are some four to five million nontraffic
misdemeanor prosecutions 54 and some forty to fifty million traffic offenses
annually.3 55 It is estimated that some 60 percent of state felony defendants need
public counsel, 56 although the percentage receiving counsel ranges from 20 to 60
percent.' 57 Of the 5,000,000 misdemeanor defendants, some 70,000 were
reported in 1967 as going to prison annually 5 . and some 1,250,000 are esti-
mated as indigent.'59 In traffic cases, one study showed that only 10 percent
involved a risk of imprisonment. 6
It is difficult to estimate how many misdemeanor or traffic cases need
counsel since it depends on the character of the case. Of the four to five million
misdemeanor prosecutions annually, not including traffic cases, the President's
Commission estimated that 30 percent may be felony-related and require sub-
stantial amounts of attorney time. Forty percent may be "social nuisance"
cases such as drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy which require less
time. Thirty percent would be comprised of a middle range of miscellaneous
350 See Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion in United States v. Thompson, 361 F. Supp. 879,
890-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
351 See Chromalloy American Corp. v. Alloy Surfaces Co., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 429 (D. Del.
1973).
352 See White v. Auerbach, 363 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
353 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 55. See also Note, 55 IowA L. REV. 1249
(1970).
354 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 55.
355 Note, 55 IowA L. REV. 1248, 1261 (1970).
356 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100. See THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 70-77.
357 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100.
358 Id. at 10.
359 Allison and Phelps, Can We Afford to Provide Trial Counsel for the Indigent in Mis-
demeanor Cases?, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 75, 86 (1971).
360 Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REv. 685, 711
(1968).
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cases, involving gambling, prostitution, or weapons.3"' It is estimated that
although 60 percent of felony defendants are indigent, the figure is only 25
percent of those charged with misdemeanors" 2 because misdemeanors can be
disposed of more quickly and private counsel, discussed earlier, can be retained
for a lesser fee. "Therefore a large percentage of misdemeanor defendants will
be able to hire their own counsel." 36
3
Attorneys would thus be needed for some 1,250,000 misdemeanor defen-
dants. 150,000 felony defendants might qualify for public counsel. Of the
40,000,000 traffic offenses annually, it is estimated that less than 25 percent,
or 10,000,000, might need counsel.6 4
Any proposal for defense services must consider the availability of resources.
It is customarily estimated that there are between 2,500 and 5,000 attorneys
practicing criminal law more than "occasionally" in a bar consisting of some
225,000 practicing attorneys.6 5 The President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment concluded that there are presently not enough experienced criminal attor-
neys even for those financially able to retain counsel." If this is so, the breadth
of need just sketched by the preceding statistics suggests a crisis of national
proportions.
A total of nearly 12,000,000 cases annually must be serviced. If the
average caseload is 250 cases, involving a range of petty and serious matters,
48,000 attorneys are needed full time. If each represents an expense of $20,000,
salary and overhead,6 7 the total cost is approximately one billion dollars. To
this should be added the cost of attorneys for the expanded range of services
discussed earlier, estimated to include some 500,000 juvenile cases, 300,000
mental illness cases and a range of appeals, warranting some 8,000 more attor-
neys or $160,000,000 per year.3 6 8
This cost is within national resources, if properly allocated. There are
enough attorneys, although presently they do not practice criminal law. Burgeon-
ing law school enrollments and an increasing interest in criminal law will add
to this reservoir of talent. The national economy, emerging from a recent, highly
expensive war, could afford the necessary expenditures. Education, welfare,
and highways annually consume far more than the amount here indicated as
necessary for defense services.
Yet there is little to indicate a national readiness to assume the full cost
of adequate defense services. Present expenditures are far less. In 1970, the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association reported that nearly 720,000
361 TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 55-56.
362 Note, 55 IowA L. Rav. 1249, 1259 (1970). But see THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at
70-77, estimating national indigency rates at 65% for felony cases and 47% for misdemeanors.
363 Id. at 1260.
364 Id. See also Note, 3 SETON HALL L. RaV. 214, 231 (1971).
365 Note, 55 IowA L. Rzv. 1249, 1262 (1970).
366 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs at 57.
367 As noted earlier, half of the full-time public defenders earn under $21,000. THE OTHER
FACE OF JUSTicE at 18. For each should be added 1/3 of the cost of an investigator and 3/2
of the cost of a secretary. IMPLEMENTING ARGERSINGER: A PREscRIPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE.
This easily amounts to $6,000. In two model budgets, the National Center for State Courts
estimated the cost per attorney as being in excess of $20,000 per year. Id. at 24-32. Hence the
figure in the text is conservative.
368 These figures are partially derived from THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 70-79.
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criminal cases were serviced by member agencies. The total cost was $39,-
600,000, or approximately $55 per case. 69 The latest study by N.L.A.D.A.
indicates a national cost per case of $122.70 A study of the Chicago defender
program reflected a cost per case of $115 in 1966, $103 in 1967, $107 in 1968,
and $62 in 1969.'' This compares with national averages of $138, $129, $123,
and $97 in each of those years.
This article thus proposes a twentyfold increase in national expenditures
for defense services. Other proposals, projecting less adequate services, have
projected dramatic, although lesser, increases. One study estimates the cost for
indigent felony representation to be $30,000,000 to $40,000,000 annually with
assigned counsel or $20,000,000 with 1,000 public defenders. 72 Misdemeanant
representation at $50 per case is placed at $50,000,000 to $60,000,000 with
assigned counsel or $31,000,000 to $46,000,000 with 1,500 to 2,300 public
defenders. Representation of traffic offenders is estimated to be $312,000,000 for
assigned counsel or $208,000,000 with 10,417 public defenders. Total cost for
representing all indigent defendants is projected to be $400,000,000 with
assigned counsel or $270,000,000 with public defenders. 73
A smaller scale approach for calculating the cost of a defense system is that
used by Anderson for Maine. 74 Excluding traffic cases, some 27,000 mis-
demeanor cases would be processed annually, of which 50 percent were esti-
mated to come within Argersinger. Of this 13,500, approximately 35 percent
might be indigent. 4,500 defendants would thus need public counsel, at $50 to
$75 per case, for a total of approximately $250,000. If seven attorneys at
$25,000 each could handle 600 cases, the cost might be $175,000 annually. A
total defender system, felony and misdemeanor, might cost $375,000 to $450,000
annually; assigned counsel might cost as much as $600,000.'
Silverstein estimated the cost of defense in two ways: per case and per
attorney.' If it costs about $150 to $200 to provide criminal defense in a felony,
then 28 to 38 million dollars would be needed for the 60 percent of state felony
prosecutions (188,000 to 314,000) involving indigents.'77 A higher figure of 84
to 158 million dollars would be required if it is assumed that 8,300 to 12,000
attorneys are needed to represent all defendants and one-half of these are needed
for indigents, at a rate (salary and overhead) of some $20,000 to $25,000 an-
nually.
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association's most recent survey,
The Other Face of Justice, undertakes by far the most comprehensive and
realistic attempt to estimate the full cost of effective counsel. It excludes traffic
representation but adds juvenile cases, concluding that some 4,000,000 cases
would annually require the services of assigned counsel or public defenders. Some
369 N.L.A.D.A. 1970 STATISTICS OF LEGAL Am AND DEFENDER WORK.
370 THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 31. The average cost in New Jersey is approximately
$175 per case for public defender services and $278 per case for assigned counsel. Id. at 36.
371 MacCarthy, The Chicago Federal Defender Program, 8 AM. CaM. L.Q. 156 '(1970).
372 Note, 55 IowA L. Rv. 1249, 1263 (1970).
373 Id. at 1264.
374 Anderson, supra note 65.
375 Id. at 17.
376 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 100, at 56.
377 Id. These figures were largely accepted by the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
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17,000 public defenders and the equivalent of 4,000 public defenders through
assigned counsel would be required. More would be needed for traffic cases,
and some 3,000 more for mental health and nondelinquency juvenile matters.
N.L.A.D.A. concludes that the cost of full-range services may exceed $800,000,-
000 at a cost per case of $121 (which N.L.A.D.A. notes may be too low) with
the National Advisory Commission caseload standards (which N.L.A.D.A. notes
may be too high).37
These studies support the conclusions in this article. The estimates are
based, however, on the systems projected. Most previous studies and com-
mentary presuppose excessive caseloads, overworked staff, inadequate funding,
and limited services. The estimates proposed by this article, in contrast, pre-
suppose a full and adequate service. A full, effective national system of criminal
defense for all indigents facing felony, misdemeanor, juvenile and serious traffic
offenses would and ought to cost in excess of one billion dollars. Instead of re-
quiring only some 12,000 attorneys, 48,000 might be a better estimate.
There are sources for finding adequate funding. Anderson's study in Maine,
which estimated a cost of roughly $400,000 for an adequate defender system,
noted that the district court system there generated an annual surplus of
$476,000.379 In Oregon, fines annually yield $6,000,000, of which the Bar
Association noted only 3.5 percent would be needed to fund an adequate system
of public counsel."s In New Jersey, some 2,800,000 traffic complaints annually
generate fines of $21,000,000. Only $6,500,000 of this is needed for court oper-
ations.3 8' The rest would or could be available to fund an adequate system of
public defense.
Another source of adequate funding is through federal financing. The Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration had a budget of nearly $700,000,000
in fiscal 1972. Only $15,000,000 went to the entire justice system, and only
$1,500,000 of that went to defense. 8 Basic value judgments seem awry when a
nation invests so heavily in policing and prosecution, without a countervailing
concern for the defense needs of its citizens.
In addition to increased funding, there are many ways to resolve the need
for manpower in defending the poor. One of these is to use nonlawyers, among
whom might be law students. The subjects of clinical legal education and stu-
dent practice are properly discussed elsewhere. 33 But it should be noted that
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in Argersinger, said:
Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide an important
source of legal representation for the indigent.... Given the huge increase
in law school enrollments over the past few years, ... I think it is plain
ment. See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE 'COURTS at 56.
378 THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE at 70-79.
379 Anderson, supra note 65, at 17.
380 Allison and Phelps, Can We Afford to Provide Trial Counsel for the Indigent in Mis-
demeanor Cases?, 13 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 75, 85 (1971).
381 Note, 3 SETON HALL L. Rav. 214, 230 (1971).
382 N.L.A.D.A., THE DOLLAR AND SENSE OF JUSTICE 26 (1973).
383 See the imaginative and thoughtful opinions of Justice Douglas in Hackin v. Arizona,
389 U.S. 143 (1967) (dissenting from dismissal of an appeal) and in Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 491-98 (1969) (concurring).
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that law students can be looked to to make a significant contribution, quanti-
tatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas,
including cases reached by today's decision.38 4
The figure of one billion dollars simply brings into stark relief the hidden
costs of overcriminalization. We have become a nation of accusers and ac-
cused. One of ten children will be a defendant in juvenile court, one of four
adults annually will be in traffic court. This is De Toqueville's dictum run wild-
he said only that every question in America ultimately finds its way into the
courts, not every person. Less criminalization and better diversion and screening
are long overdue.
There are many good reasons for decriminalization and the cost of an
adequate defense system is one of them. Some 40 percent of the nontraffic
arrests in the United States are alcohol-related and many of these lead to custody.
Eliminating such cases from the system would ease enormously the strain upon
already overtaxed resources. Some 78 percent of all criminal offenses in
California's district courts are traffic-related; the National Advisory Commission
has urged disposing of these administratively to release resources for other pur-
poses. Domestic disputes have no place in the courts. Creditor fraud claims
should be settled outside the criminal courts. Narcotics should lead to treatment,
not arrest and incarceration. Processing of youth offenders can be accommodated
by expansion of juvenile court jurisdiction. These are not new proposals, but
their relevance to caseload and cost warrants emphasis here.
In dismissing prosecutions because there were no publicly provided at-
torneys to represent the defendants, the Superior Court for the District of
Columbia observed that "In a criminal justice system plagued by scarce resources,
it is sheer folly to squander what little is available on wholesale prosecution of
victimless crimes."3 5 That court thus confronted and acknowledged the basic
truth urged here: the price of prosecution is defense. If society lacks the re-
sources for the latter it is because of profligacy in the former.
VII. Conclusion
This article has proposed some new directions for providing defense services
to the poor. No one of these ideas, however, is without precedent or analogue.
It is important to view the right to counsel as not simply a constitutional
principle but as a form of entitlement to public assistance. In that light, the
recent revolution in concepts concerning welfare becomes relevant. Gone are
concepts of privilege, the dole, and charity. In their place are doctrines of "new
property" and entitlement.
The implications of such thinking for right to counsel cases are profound.
The traditional view that indigent counsel somehow function at the pleasure of
the court whose responsibility includes protecting the economic base of the
private bar must be abandoned. The traditional mode of administering defense
services by after-the-fact postconviction relief must be supplemented. The end
384 407 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1972).
385 United States v. Chatman, 42 U.S.L.W. 2593 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 7, 1974).
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result must be an administrative structure assuring better quality service to the
poor across a full spectrum of representation.
As novel as these ideas may appear, they nevertheless tap existing resources.
Courts now have rule-making powers concerning indigent representation and
licensing of attorneys. They must take the initiative and adopt rules to imple-
ment existing case law as to effectiveness of counsel. By these rules, courts may
create-or compel the creation of-adequate defense services. The model for
administering such services is now in existence in most communities in the form
of civil neighborhood legal services programs.
Perhaps the most startling conclusion in this article is the cost of full, effec-
tive, expanded defense services. A figure of one billion dollars per year is indeed
dramatic. However, here too existing concepts are directly relevant. An ex-
pansion of services is inevitable in the light of Argersinger concerning the types
of cases requiring counsel, and in light of other cases relating to quality of
counsel. The heightened cost of counsel, from another perspective, is simply an
open acknowledgement and by-product of the growing problems of over-
criminalization and inefficiency of our justice system. The cost of defense can
be reduced by such urgently needed reforms as decriminalizing motor vehicle,
alcohol, and drug-related offenses, adopting pretrial diversion and more effective
police techniques, streamlining court processes and administration, and develop-
ing effective institutions and services for treating, rehabilitating, and training
those convicted of crime.
If all these reforms were adopted, the cost of effective defense systems would
be substantially reduced. The need for such systems, however, would remain.
We are still a long way from implementing the fundamental values of Gideon
and Argersinger. The price of our societal failure and neglect has grievously
fallen, as it so often does, upon that segment of society least able to bear the
cost: the poor.
It seems appropriate to recall the words of Chief Justice Harlar, over half
a century ago:
A petty tyrant in a police court, refusals of a fair hearing in minor civil
courts . . . there is work for lawyers. The Supreme Court of the United
States and the Court of Appeals will take care of themselves. Look after
the courts of the poor, who stand most in need of justice. The security of
the Republic will be found in the treatment of the poor and the ignorant;
in indifference to their misery and helplessness lies disaster.38 6
386 42 Rep. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n 240, 241 (1919).
